The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

The UK should also “continue talking up the role of the UN in advising on the

constitutional process as set out in SCR 1546” and “find roles for countries which give

them a stake in the process”.

367. The letter also stated that:

“Fallujah was a tactical success. Although many insurgents slipped away, it achieved

its primary military objective of denying the insurgents their main safe haven.

Politically it has boosted the authority of the IIG, while the domestic and regional fall

out has been limited.”

368. Looking ahead to election security, the letter stated that:

“The sheer number of polling booths will make it hard to provide security for them all,

but also makes it hard for the insurgents to close down voting in whole areas.

“The level of threat in some areas is clear from the attacks already being attempted

in registration. In Salah ad Din province the Iraqi police report terrorists have

already been distributing 120 IEDs and VBIEDs [vehicle-borne improvised explosive

devices] to disturb the elections.”

369. During a video conference with President Bush on 30 November, Mr Blair said that

Fallujah “had gone well” and the story of what US forces had found there – including

evidence of torture chambers – should be put into the public domain.196

370. Mr Blair suggested that the operation had “sent a clear message that the

insurgents could not win”.

371. The JIC reviewed the impact of Fallujah on 8 December.197

372. It judged that “Fallujah has been removed as a symbol of the impotence of the Iraqi

Interim Government (IIG) and of resistance to the Multi-National Force (MNF)”.

373. Whilst the area was “no longer a major insurgent base” the JIC observed that

“details of how the insurgency operated in the city, and in particular the relationship

between the various insurgent elements, are yet to emerge”. Overall:

“Fallujah has been a setback for the insurgents, but in response they demonstrated

a high level of capacity to mount attacks across Sunni Arab areas of Iraq and

they are far from defeated. The present lull in violence is unlikely to last. Further

surges in violence should be expected, particularly to disrupt the electoral process.

Intimidation of voters and attacks on election and other infrastructure will be

key objectives.

196 Letter Quarrey to Owen, 30 November 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 30 November:

Iraq, Syria and Iran’.

197 JIC Assessment 8 December 2004, ‘Iraq Security: The Impact of Fallujah’.

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