9.7 | May 2008 to October 2009

Iran understands that an Iraq ruled by a Shia government is unlikely to pose a threat

to the Iranian regime.”

473. Mr McDonald called Prime Minister Maliki’s Chief Political Adviser on 6 August,

and asked whether the Iraqi Government could provide an answer on whether they

would extend the former security agreement.194 Prime Minister Maliki’s Political Adviser

said that legal advice was that the Council of Ministers could not do so; the Council of

Representatives must agree.

474. In the absence of an agreement, Mr McDonald proposed that four naval trainers

and one naval operational commander should be appointed as naval attachés to the

British Embassy. Their names had already been submitted through the normal process.

Mr McDonald “emphasised this was a key point for us, this matter was entirely in GoI

hands, and the signal sent by this would be serious in our eyes”.

475. On 18 August, Mr Hutton’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Brown’s Assistant Private

Secretary with an update on the defence agreement.195 He explained that the Iraqi

Government had made it clear they were not prepared to offer an interim agreement and

that all military personnel except five liaison officers in Kuwait had returned to the UK.

US teams would take over the UK tasks in approximately late September, but would step

aside if the UK/Iraq agreement was signed in October.

476. Mr Prentice had discussed bringing UK activity at Umm Qasr under NATO

auspices with the US commander, who was enthusiastic provided it did not breach the

300-person ceiling allowed by the NATO-Iraq agreement. As a result:

“We are now working with the US to identify the minimum number of UK personnel

required to do the training task. If the UK/Iraq defence agreement fails to have its

third reading by mid-October, US commanders will then go to the Iraqi Defence

Minister and invite him to decide whether to incorporate the Umm Qasr activity

permanently under NATO (using UK trainers) and accept compensating reductions

elsewhere in the NATO establishment.”

477. The Private Secretary added: “Defence Secretary is content with this approach

provided that the Government of Iraq explicitly agree and that other NATO allies are

also content.”

478. Mr Brown spoke to Prime Minister Maliki on 23 August, and said that the defence

agreement was “unfinished business which we trusted could be resolved”.196 Prime

Minister Maliki indicated his support, but suggested that the Iraqi Parliament’s actions

were “politically motivated”.

194 Email Wilks to Cabinet Office [junior official], 6 August 2009, ‘Simon McDonald call on Sadiq al-Rikabi:

UK/Iraq Training Agreement’.

195 Letter Ferguson to Catsaras, 18 August 2009, ‘Iraq: UK Defence Agreement’.

196 Letter Catsaras to Brooker, 24 August 2009, ‘Prime Minister’s Call with Iraqi Prime Minister, 23 August’.

463