The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
945.
While the
exceptional nature of the negotiations would have made
it
impossible
for Lord Goldsmith to follow each twist and turn of the
negotiations,
he was not
sent the records of some of the most critical
discussions.
946.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote that, as Ms Adams had told the Inquiry, his Office was
not
sent copies
of all the telegrams during the negotiation process. In particular,
he had not
seen those
reporting “some of the most critical discussions”.343
947.
Ms Adams told
the Inquiry that the Attorney General’s Office (then known as
the
Legal
Secretariat to the Law Officers (LSLO)) received telegrams from
UKMIS New York
and from
the Foreign Office itself:
“… during
the course of the negotiation … there were two distributions for
telegrams
… and … a
lot of the very critical points in the negotiation were issues that
were
discussed
between the Foreign Secretary and US Secretary Powell and
obviously
the French
Foreign Minister and so on. Those records of rather key moments
were
not coming
to us at the time.”344
948.
The evidence
confirms that Lord Goldsmith did not see records of key
discussions
between
Mr Blair and Mr Straw and their counterparts, or
proposals on the draft
resolution
which were being discussed within the UK Government, before
decisions
were
taken.
949.
Mr Macleod
told the Inquiry that, during the negotiation of resolutions 1154
and
1205 in
1997 and 1998, he had been working in the Attorney General’s
Office. In relation
to
resolution 1154, he described a letter and briefing which took him
and the Attorney
General
through the background in New York, the UN processes, the
significance
of the different
terminology, the origins of the revival doctrine and the view of
previous
Law
Officers on it:
“The
picture that emerges is very much of the Attorney’s office being
told what was
happening,
being offered ideas about what the future shape of the resolution
might
be, being
asked for advice on whether one formulation was the stronger basis
than
another and
giving views on that.”345
950.
After the
adoption of resolution 1154 and before and during the
negotiation
of resolution
1205 Mr Macleod stated:
“… it [the
process] worked exactly the same way; we knew what was coming,
there
were drafts
going round, different operative paragraphs. I think there were
even
drafts of
the explanations of vote, and they were gone through both before
and after
the
adoption of the text, and I think there was guidance from the
Attorney.”
343
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraph 1.8.
344
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 10.
345
Public
hearing, 30 June 2010, pages 14‑15.
368