3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
message to
Iraq “if the Council were not able to pass this
straightforward
justified resolution”.
•
Mr Lavrov
had said implementation of 1441 and 1284 should continue
“until
the inspectors
encountered impediments and obstacles”. Iraq was “not
blocking
the work of
[the] inspectors and was more and more actively
co-operating
on
substance”. That was “the result” of “continuing pressure” from a
“unified”
Council
“and the strong inspection mandate which could, if necessary,
be
made more
effective”. Facts were needed “to close this issue”.
He suggested
distribution
of UNMOVIC’s “clusters” document to provide the basis
for discussion.
•
Mr Aguilar
Zinser, Mexican Permanent representative to the UN, said
Mexico
“still
wanted: disarmament; a peaceful solution; inspections … and
multilateral
consideration
of this issue” and, unusually, asked the UK, US and Spain a
series
of
questions about the proposal.
•
Mr Juan
Gabriel Valdés, Chilean Permanent Representative to the UN
“urged
the P5 to
find a solution”. He “did not reject the use of force but it must
only
be once
all peaceful means had been exhausted”. He “wanted the
continuation
of
inspections for some time before a definitive report”.
•
Mr Inocencio
Arias, Spanish Permanent Representative to the UN, had
said the
draft was “one more step in imposing serious diplomatic
pressure”.
Saddam
Hussein co-operated only under pressure. The more time was
given,
“the less
pressure he would face”.254
827.
Sir Jeremy
reported that the points he had made included:
•
We were not
getting Iraqi co-operation because “the ‘zero’ Iraq had
declared
was a
lie”.
•
Iraq was
“trickling out concessions to divide the Council, buy time and
avert
military
action while continuing concealment”.
•
It was
“very probable that Iraq would decide to destroy the Al Samoud
missiles.
In addition
they might also start trickling out what they claimed to be
newly
discovered
documents and announce ‘private’ interviews which would in
reality
still be
monitored and taped.”
•
He
“recognised” that he was “saying things that could not be confirmed
by the
inspectors”,
but the UK had “invested in facilities not available to other
member
states or
the inspectors because our national interest was at stake and the
UN
was being
defied. We were providing detailed intelligence to the
inspectors”.
•
It was “our
word against Saddam’s – but Council members had to choose
whom
they
believed”.
254
Telegram
318 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 27
February Consultations
and
Missiles’.
327