The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Given the
risk of casualties, military and civilian, “doing this in the
context of
international
opposition would be very tough”.
•
Arab
opinion wanted “it done”, and wanted “it done quickly”, but they
were
assuming a
second resolution: “Without one they will be in a real bind,
especially
if parts of
Europe, Russia, China, etc were all vociferous in their
opposition.”
•
Saddam
Hussein would be “emboldened by a lack of international support for
us
and
weakened by its existence”. If he believed international opinion
was against
the US and
UK, he might hunker down in Baghdad.
•
Internecine
fighting in Iraq when a military strike destabilised the regime
would
be the
“biggest risk”: “They are perfectly capable, on previous form, of
killing
each other
in large numbers.” The US and UK “would need the backing of
the
international
community and preferably the UN to handle it”; without that
the
US and
UK would “get the blame for any fighting”.
•
If they
forfeited the UN route, the US and UK would lose the high
ground.
They had
“invested huge capital” in that and it had given everyone “a
big
comfort
blanket”. If that were taken away, it would be “about US power,
naked
and in your
face”. There were “big majorities against action without UN
backing
everywhere,
even in the UK” and “even in the UK Cabinet”. That would be
“so
in spades”
if the UN inspectors appeared to be asking for more time and
the
US and
UK were refusing.
657.
Addressing the
“way through”, Mr Blair wrote:
“In truth,
the world is in contradiction. No one is really prepared for war,
except us.
But equally
no one believes Saddam is telling the truth. In part we are victims
of our
own
success. Your strength … has forced Saddam to let inspectors back
in; has
made him
seem weak and back in his box. So, everyone asks: why
bother?
“But they
also know, deep down, WMD is an issue and that given half a
chance
Saddam
would be at it again. And they don’t want, ideally to fall out with
the US.
But to
avoid falling out, they need some cover.”
658.
Mr Blair
described the position of France and Germany as being that the
inspectors
were in
Iraq “to play hide and seek”, and “they should stay as long as it
takes for them to
find
anything without any obligation on Saddam other than not to hinder
them”.
659.
The “true
view”, however, was that resolution 1441 gave Iraq a “duty”
to
“co‑operate
fully: not just in access, but in being open, honest and
transparent about
where WMD
was and actively helping the inspectors to seize and destroy it”.
Dr Blix
accepted
that view:
“… if
things carry on as they are, then he will say that there is not
full co‑operation
though
there is not either the absence of any
co‑operation;
but as he continues
to demand
Iraq fully co‑operates and they continue to refuse, this pattern
of
non‑co‑operation
– even in the absence of any ‘smoking gun’ is sufficient for
him
to harden
up his findings; and I think it will be sufficient for
us.”
116