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4.3  |  Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
604.  The sub-source for the 45 minute report had provided five reports which were
drawn on in the JIC Assessments of 21 August, 9 September, 11 October, 6 December
2002 and 19 February 2003. In addition, he had provided the reporting for the
JIC Update of 27 November.
605.  Mr Dowse wrote that, while the intelligence was not “crucial to key judgements” in
the JIC Assessments, it had:
“… increased our confidence in judgements that Saddam possessed and was
prepared to use chemical and biological weapons – but these also rested on
other intelligence.”
606.  Reporting from the sub-source was crucial on “one detailed point”, the statement
in the 9 September Assessment that Iraq could deploy chemical and biological weapons
within 45 minutes.
607.  Mr Dowse added:
“However, this would not have materially affected the key JIC judgements on Iraqi
capabilities: it was seen simply as extra detail supporting the picture of the Iraqi
command and control structure that we already had, based on other intelligence.
The prominence this point has received in the media since the conflict was not how
it was seen by the JIC at the time.”
608.  An internal SIS minute of 8 June also identified that the sub-source had
provided a report in late 2002 that Iraq had an indigenous UAV programme capable of
CBW delivery.236
609.  Mr Dowse wrote to Sir Nigel Sheinwald again on 7 July, reporting that SIS had
provided a more detailed summary of its work to validate the pre-conflict sources on
Iraqi WMD, which was continuing.237
610.  Mr Dowse concluded:
“… we see no reason at present to revise JIC judgements on Iraqi WMD beyond
the (objectively minor, but presentationally very awkward) point over the ‘45
minutes’ claim …”
611.  The Butler Report published on 14 July stated that serious doubts had
emerged about the reliability of intelligence from three sources.
612.  The Butler Report recorded that SIS had:
“… provided a series of commentaries on the results of their post-war validation
of the main sources of human intelligence … on Iraqi chemical and biological
236  Minute SIS, 8 June 2004, ‘Butler Review/SIS: Sourcing of 45 Minute Report’.
237  Minute Dowse to Sheinwald, 7 July 2004, ‘Validation of Sources on Iraqi WMD’.
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