6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
Ministerial
consideration, challenge and direction of post-conflict planning
and
preparation.
388.
Asked by the
Inquiry whether having more stress testing by very senior
Ministers
not
directly involved with Iraq issues might have helped to highlight
some of the
weaknesses
in areas such as post-conflict planning, Mr Blair
replied:
“… in one
sense I would like to say ‘yes’, because it would be in a way an
easy
enough
concession to make. My frank belief is it would not have made a
great deal
of
difference, no. The committee meetings that we had, small ‘a’,
small ‘h’, ad hoc
meetings, I
think there were 28 of them, 14 of which were minuted. I had the
right
people
there … no-one was saying to me ‘Do it a different way’. I mean, if
someone
had I would
have listened to it, but I have to say to you in addition when I
looked,
for
example, at Mrs Thatcher’s War Cabinet, it didn’t have the
Chancellor of the
Exchequer
on it … you have there the people that you need
there.”221
389.
No Ministerial
Group along the lines recommended by Sir David Manning
was
convened
until the “War Cabinet” met on 19 March 2003, the day the invasion
began
390.
The inner
group of officials, which discussed a range of issues including
counter-
terrorism
and Afghanistan, was known as the Restricted COBR or COBR(R).
Records
of the
meetings were not produced, although actions were recorded in some
instances.
391.
The Wider
Group, known as the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq (AHGI), met for the
first
time on 20
September.
392.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit expressed concern to Mr Hoon about the new
Whitehall
arrangements.
393.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit set out his views to Mr Hoon on 17 September:
“Mindful of
the difficulties (and frustrations) we have experienced in the past
in
establishing
the right machinery and processes to run crucial
politico/military
campaigns,
I saw David Manning yesterday to discuss the arrangements
which
might be
presented to the Prime Minister, designed to help successful
delivery of
an Iraq
campaign.
“I reminded
David of the importance of a small ‘core’ Ministerial team, meeting
very
regularly
to execute daily business (as distinct from less frequent policy
meetings
and Cabinet
itself). I outlined the linkage needed with the wider COBR and
DOP
machinery
that would pull in government departments and agencies as a whole
…
“David said
that he had little influence over such matters as distinct from
Jonathan
[Powell].
However, he took the point, especially about the importance of
acting
221
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 26-27.
222
Minute
Drummond to Rycroft, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq Ministerial
Meeting’.
177