The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
343.
Summarising
his position, Mr Blair wrote:
“So: my
strategy is to build this over time until we get to the point where
military
action
could be taken if necessary; but meanwhile bring people towards
us,
undermine
Saddam, without so alarming people about the immediacy of
action
that we
frighten the horses, lose Russia and/or half the EU and nervous
Arab states
and find
ourselves facing a choice between massive intervention and
nothing.”
344.
Addressing
Syria and Iran, Mr Blair wrote:
“If
toppling Saddam is a prime objective, it is far easier to do it
with Syria and Iran in
favour or
acquiescing rather than hitting all three at once. I favour giving
these two a
chance at a
different relationship … in return for closing down support for
Hizbollah
and Hamas
and helping us over Iraq. I don’t underestimate the problems …
but
I think
it is possible …”
345.
Mr Blair also
identified the dangers in any action of “unintended consequences”
for
international
support. He added that the outcome of Afghanistan would be
important to
Phase 2. If
Afghanistan was left as a:
“… better
country, having supplied humanitarian aid and having given new hope
to
the people,
we will not just have won militarily but morally; and the coalition
will back
us to do
more elsewhere. In particular, we shall have given regime change a
good
name, which
will help us in the argument over Iraq. So in my view, the
political and
diplomatic
must always be reinforcing the military.”
346.
Mr Blair drew
attention to the need to put the Middle East Peace Process “back
on
track” or
it would “complicate everything”.
347.
Finally, Mr
Blair suggested that the US and UK should be working with
Pakistan,
Saudi
Arabia and other Muslim countries “on a strategy for confronting
Islamic
fundamentalism
and extremism”.
348.
Sir David
Manning delivered the paper to the US.
349.
Following
discussions in Washington, Sir David reported that the
US
Administration
was “open to Mr Blair’s ideas”, and that the
discussions
“had been
worth the journey”.
350.
Sir David
also advised that there was a need to “make more of the
WMD
menace
presented by Saddam”.
351.
Following
talks in Washington, at which Sir Richard Dearlove had also
been
present,
Sir David Manning reported that he had taken Dr Rice through Mr
Blair’s paper,
including
the “vital need” for progress on the MEPP.161
The US
response had been
“encouraging”,
except on the MEPP.
161
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 6 December 2001, ‘Meeting with Condi
Rice: Iraq and Phase 2’.
370