14.2  |  Conclusions: Military equipment (post‑conflict)

37.  In March 2007, the report of a visit to Iraq by Lord Drayson, then the Minister of

State for Defence Equipment and Support, prompted work to improve communication

channels between the MOD and theatre.

38.  Lord Drayson reported that “overall there was a clear perception in theatre that the

UK MOD was not taking account of the rate of change. UORs too often sought to deliver

a perfect capability, but in doing so delivered so late the requirement had changed or

theatre were without any capability for too long”.15 He suggested that “greater dialogue”

between theatre and the Equipment Capability Customer could help to address the issue.

39.  In September 2007, following an “extensive review and analysis”16 of the UK’s force

protection capability, the DOC concluded that management of force protection risk must

be based “on a thorough identification of strategic and operational threats to ensure

that a balance of research, investment and training was achieved commensurate with

the threat”.

40.  As a result, a force protection policy was produced in November 2007 which sought

to apply a standard approach to the risk assessment of force protection and lay out the

respective roles and responsibilities across the MOD.

41.  The MOD told the Inquiry that the force protection policy in use in 2015 “defines

risk ownership and governance more clearly than its predecessors”17 and that the

policy had been integrated into wider MOD risk management processes which had

also been revised.

FUNDING AND THE FUTURE RAPID EFFECT SYSTEM (FRES)

42.  Lord Drayson told the Inquiry that he believed “the Army’s difficulty in deciding upon

a replacement to Snatch was in part caused by their concern over the likelihood of

FRES budgets being cut to fund a Snatch replacement vehicle”.18

43.  Although the Inquiry has identified issues concerning clarity of responsibility and

communication, it has not found evidence to suggest that funding was a direct barrier

to the identification and deployment of additional solutions to the PPV capability gap.

44.  It is possible, however, that the need to preserve funding for the Future Rapid Effect

System (FRES) programme influenced decisions on the requirement for PPVs.

45.  The FRES programme remained distinct from meeting the requirement for an

appropriate PPV in Iraq. FRES was never intended to be in service until towards 2010.

However, a number of witnesses to the Inquiry made the point that, within a finite

budget, resources for an additional requirement would have to be found from elsewhere

15  Minute APS/MIN(DES) to PSSC/SofS [MOD], 26 March 2007, ‘Minister(DES) Visit to Iraq’.

16  Report DOC, September 2007, ‘Protection of the Deployed Force Operational Audit Report 1/07’.

17  Statement MOD, 26 June 2015, ‘Procuring Military Equipment’.

18  Statement, 15 December 2010, page 4.

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