12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
have for
our future operations and indeed rationale. Firstly, the
‘Untouchable’ status
of ISOF is
already being attacked by the sectional interest within the GOI
that (quite
rightly)
feel threatened by such a body. The fear is that their freedom of
movement
and action
is curtailed, their operations politically constrained; this would
be most
damaging to
ISOF itself and PM Maliki’s ability to operate to the national
interest.
Secondly,
the danger is that political constraints are so tightly drawn that
MND(SE)
cannot
operate against the 10 percent threat to the Iraqi end state. If we
ever
reached the
stage when MND(SE) were restricted to operations in pursuit of our
own
force
protection, we would need seriously to question our rationale for
being here.”
1369.
Maj Gen Shaw
said in his evidence to the Inquiry that “all kinds of
mistreatment
of
prisoners” were found during the raid, including the rape of a
woman in front of her
two
children.1254
However,
the mistreatment was not the political headline, “the
political
headline
was that we had broached Iraqi sovereignty”. Maj Gen Shaw
concluded:
“So yes,
that was a mistake, it was an unfortunate raid, we learned lessons
from it,
we played
even more gingerly with Shia political sensitivities
thereafter.”
1370.
On 20 March,
ACM Stirrup told Mr Blair that “Petraeus had been helpful
in
handling
the fallout from the raid on the NIIA headquarters, and that this
was in any case
having only
a limited effect on operations in Basra itself.”1255
1371.
Maj Gen Shaw
reported on 21 March: “The ripples of the raid on the NIIA
are
seemingly
spreading the further we get from the operation
itself.”1256
1372.
The IMOD had
issued a letter stating that joint operations between the
Iraqi
Army in
Basra and the MNF should cease temporarily. Although that had since
been
rescinded,
Maj Gen Shaw commented that “this makes moving Basra
forward towards
PIC more
difficult”.
1373.
On the same
day, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary updated Mr Blair on the
continued
fallout
from the raid.1257
The MNF‑I
investigation into the NIIA raid had concluded that
the
operation
was conducted in good faith and in support of Iraqi law. But there
had been no
notification
to either the Iraqi Government or Gen Petraeus because the
operation had
been deemed
time sensitive. The raid was described as “aggressive but
professional”
and it was
miscommunication that had led to the prisoners
escaping.
1374.
It took until
late April for the police mission to regain access to the
NIIA
1254
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 18.
1255
Letter
Banner to Hickey, 20 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Officials’.
1256
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 21 March 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 21
March 2007’.
1257
Minute
Banner to Blair, 21 March 2007, ‘Phonecall with
Maliki’.
1258
Letter
Tinline to Aldred, 26 April 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
373