Previous page | Contents | Next page
12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
have for our future operations and indeed rationale. Firstly, the ‘Untouchable’ status
of ISOF is already being attacked by the sectional interest within the GOI that (quite
rightly) feel threatened by such a body. The fear is that their freedom of movement
and action is curtailed, their operations politically constrained; this would be most
damaging to ISOF itself and PM Maliki’s ability to operate to the national interest.
Secondly, the danger is that political constraints are so tightly drawn that MND(SE)
cannot operate against the 10 percent threat to the Iraqi end state. If we ever
reached the stage when MND(SE) were restricted to operations in pursuit of our own
force protection, we would need seriously to question our rationale for being here.”
1369.  Maj Gen Shaw said in his evidence to the Inquiry that “all kinds of mistreatment
of prisoners” were found during the raid, including the rape of a woman in front of her
two children.1254 However, the mistreatment was not the political headline, “the political
headline was that we had broached Iraqi sovereignty”. Maj Gen Shaw concluded:
“So yes, that was a mistake, it was an unfortunate raid, we learned lessons from it,
we played even more gingerly with Shia political sensitivities thereafter.”
1370.  On 20 March, ACM Stirrup told Mr Blair that “Petraeus had been helpful in
handling the fallout from the raid on the NIIA headquarters, and that this was in any case
having only a limited effect on operations in Basra itself.”1255
1371.  Maj Gen Shaw reported on 21 March: “The ripples of the raid on the NIIA are
seemingly spreading the further we get from the operation itself.”1256
1372.  The IMOD had issued a letter stating that joint operations between the Iraqi
Army in Basra and the MNF should cease temporarily. Although that had since been
rescinded, Maj Gen Shaw commented that “this makes moving Basra forward towards
PIC more difficult”.
1373.  On the same day, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary updated Mr Blair on the continued
fallout from the raid.1257 The MNF‑I investigation into the NIIA raid had concluded that the
operation was conducted in good faith and in support of Iraqi law. But there had been no
notification to either the Iraqi Government or Gen Petraeus because the operation had
been deemed time sensitive. The raid was described as “aggressive but professional”
and it was miscommunication that had led to the prisoners escaping.
1374.  It took until late April for the police mission to regain access to the NIIA
building.1258
1254  Public hearing, 11 January 2010, page 18.
1255  Letter Banner to Hickey, 20 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Officials’.
1256  Minute Shaw to CJO, 21 March 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 21 March 2007’.
1257  Minute Banner to Blair, 21 March 2007, ‘Phonecall with Maliki’.
1258  Letter Tinline to Aldred, 26 April 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly Report’.
373
Previous page | Contents | Next page