The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
622.
Mr Straw
advised Mr Blair that he interpreted Mr Annan’s
“important” statement
on 10
March:
“…
essentially as a gypsies’ warning not to try and then fail with a
second resolution.
If the last
current act of the Security Council on Iraq is 1441, we can
genuinely claim
that we
have met Kofi’s call for unity and for acting within (our
interpretation of) the
authority
of the Security Council.”
623.
There was no
reference in the minute to President Chirac’s remarks the
previous
evening.
624.
Mr Straw
advised Mr Blair that it would not be possible to decide what
the
Parliamentary
Labour Party (PLP) and the House of Commons would agree
until
deliberations
in the Security Council had concluded. If a second resolution was
agreed
it would
be “fine”, but that was “unlikely”. He added:
“I sensed
yesterday that sentiment might be shifting our way; but we would
need to
be very
clear of the result before putting down a resolution approving
military action.
We could
not possibly countenance the risk of a defeat …
“But it
need not be a disaster for you, the Government, and even more
important for
our troops,
if we cannot take an active part in the initial invasion, provided
we get on
the front
foot with our strategy.
“I am aware
of all the difficulties of the UK standing aside from invasion
operations,
not least
given the level of integration of our forces with those of the US.
But
I understand
that the US could if necessary adjust their plan rapidly to cope
without
us … [W]e
could nevertheless offer them a major UK contribution to the
overall
campaign.
In addition to staunch political support, this would
include:
•
intelligence
co-operation;
•
use of
Diego Garcia, Fairford and Cyprus, subject to the usual
consultation on
targeting;
•
as soon as
combat operations are over, full UK participation in the military
and
civilian
tasks, including taking responsibility for a sector and for
humanitarian
and
reconstruction work. We could also take the lead in the UN on
securing the
…
resolution to authorise the reconstruction effort and the UN role
in it which the
US now
agree is necessary.”
“We will
obviously need to discuss all this, but I thought it best to put it
in your mind
as event[s]
could move fast. And what I propose is a great deal better than
the
alternatives.
When Bush graciously accepted your offer to be with him all the
way,
he wanted
you alive not dead!”
626.
Mr Straw’s
minute was not sent to Lord Goldsmith or Mr Hoon.
114