The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
by the
Charge of the Knights. In the short term, he did not think that the
increased JAM
presence
would destabilise Maysan:
“… as it is
already under de facto ‘Sadr’ control from Governor Maliki
downwards
and the
local ISF are unlikely to take any action against them. Of more
concern
is the
likelihood they are using this period to discuss their future
strategy for JAM
co-operation
in Iraq. In the event of an ISF-MNF operation to secure al-Amara,
it
is likely
that the majority of key leaders will attempt to cross the border
into Iran.
In due
course they will try to return to Basra, an eventuality we must
take care to
guard against.”
1037.
In Basra,
there was a continuing “anti-British sentiment” in Basra Palace,
where
the
presence of UK personnel was still not welcomed.
1038.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner reported that, at the MNF-I Conference in
Baghdad,
Ambassador
Crocker had described the action in Basra as “a defining moment in
the
Iraqi
mission showing an assertion of Iraqi sovereignty by the GoI
previously not seen”.
1039.
Lt Gen
Houghton visited Iraq on 25 April, to “talk through the options for
the
UK’s
operational commitment to southern Iraq during the remainder of
2008” with
Gen
Petraeus, as ACM Stirrup had agreed he would.512
Reporting
the meeting to
ACM Stirrup,
he explained that he had set out the UK position as:
“a. That
the UK should retain two-star Command of the four southern
provinces for
the
immediate future.
b. That the
UK could only commit to tasks within a force level ceiling
of
4,100 troops.
c. That
this force level ceiling only allowed the UK to effectively meet
the following
tasks:
(1)
Provision of an integrated Division/Brigade composite
Headquarters;
(2) MiTTing
the BOC [Basra Operational Command].
(3) MiTTing
of 14 IA Div with supporting QRFs [Quick Reaction
Forces]
(4)
Security of Umm Qasr;
(5) NaTT
[Navy Training Team];
(6) BIA
[Basra International Airport] Commercialisation.
(7) Force
Protection.
(8) Force
Support.”
1040.
Lt Gen
Houghton went on to explain that if the coalition was going to be
able to
exploit the
opportunities now offered in Basra and not allow the situation to
be reversed,
512
Minute
Houghton to PSO/CDS, 26 April 2008, ‘CJO – Gen Petraeus Meeting 25
Apr 08’.
376