3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
133.
When the
Chiefs of Staff discussed Iraq planning on 25 September,
Admiral
Sir Michael
Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff, emphasised that:
“…
expectation management with respect to UK caveats had to be
taut.
Package 2 …
was a formidable contribution in its own right and Package 3, given
its
importance
to the US, was not just a ‘nice to have’.”40
134.
Sir David
Manning’s record of the meeting on 23 September, issued
on
25 September,
stated that Mr Blair had agreed that “we should present
Package 2
as a potential
contribution at the CENTCOM Planning Conference”.41
“We should
not
be shy
about presenting this as a significant and valuable offer.” Units
for Op FRESCO
should be
re‑allocated to maintain the possibility of a Land Force
contribution, with
minimum
publicity. Mr Blair did not, however, want “any suggestion”
that the UK might
offer “a
major land contribution to a Force in northern Iraq. We should not
surface the
possibility
at the [US] Planning conference.”
135.
By that time,
the MOD had already acted. Mr Hoon’s Private Office
replied
to No.10 immediately,
stating:
“Separately
and heavily caveated, we have indicated to CENTCOM that we
are
still
considering a Land option … [W]e agreed that the UK involvement …
should
continue on
this basis. Defence staffs will continue actively to ensure that
US
expectations
remain realistic.”42
136.
Sir David
Manning commented to Mr Jonathan Powell: “Just about OK”
and
referred to
being “bounced” by the MOD.43
137.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 23 September that the dossier “would show that
the
policy of
containment had worked up to a point” but Saddam Hussein
“continued
to rebuild”
his weapons of mass destruction.
138.
Cabinet was
informed that the question of military action would arise
“only
if
inspections were thwarted again”; and “there would be a discussion
about the
military
options”.
139.
Mr Blair
concluded that a “crunch point” had been reached with
the
sanctions
regime being eroded and Saddam Hussein “on the way to
acquiring
40
Minutes, 25
September 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
41
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 25 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contribution to Any Military Action’.
42
Letter
Williams to Manning, 25 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contribution to Any Military Action’.
43
Manuscript
comments Manning to Powell on Letter Williams to Manning, 25
September 2002,
‘Iraq: Potential
UK Contribution to Any Military Action’.
221