The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
He had also
stated that, since promising on 16 September to allow
the
unconditional
return of inspectors, Iraq had fired on coalition aircraft 67
times
with the
clear inference that Iraq was threatening US
interests.
•
A White
House spokesman had stated that “regime change is welcome
whatever
form it
takes”; and that “the cost of one bullet” fired by the Iraqi people
would be
“substantially
less” than the cost of military action.
352.
The FCO
instructed Sir Jeremy Greenstock to use Dr Blix’s report to
the Security
Council on
3 October to emphasise that key issues remained to be resolved and
a new
resolution
was “essential to demonstrate that the UNSC is determined to ensure
proper
inspections
this time, backed up by the will to enforce its decisions if
necessary”.119
In an
interview for the BBC’s
Today programme
on 1 October, Mr Blair had stated that a
tougher
resolution was necessary before the inspectors
returned.
353.
While
recognising that Member States could not dictate the inspectors’
activities,
the UK was
concerned that inspectors should not return to Iraq before “new
modalities”
had been
agreed.
354.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that Dr Blix’s view, as expressed to the
Security
Council on
3 October, was that, while it would be helpful to reaffirm and
strengthen
UNMOVIC’s
rights, there was no legal need for a new resolution before the
inspectors
returned.120
His “main
concern” was “unanimity and a Council willingness to
back
inspectors
up”. If there was going to be a new resolution there would be no
point in
returning
to Iraq only for new arrangements then to be put in
place.
355.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told the Council that a further resolution was
necessary
to ensure
the inspectors were effective. Iraq was continuing to take measures
to conceal
its WMD
facilities and stocks. The Council needed to hear from Dr Blix
and Dr ElBaradei
what
additional measures were required and it would be prudent to tie up
loose ends –
“one man’s
loose end could be another man’s casus belli”.
356.
The agreement
reached in Vienna was set out in a letter of 8 October from
Dr Blix
and
Dr ElBaradei to the Government of Iraq.121
It was
subsequently endorsed by the
Security
Council and resolution 1441 (OP6) made its contents legally
binding.
357.
Negotiations
on the content of the draft resolution between the UK and
US
and with
other members of the P5 continued without agreement being
reached
on a
text which would secure support in the Security
Council.
358.
The FCO
considered that the two stage approach would mean a
second
resolution
would be required to authorise the use of force.
119
Telegram
576 FCO London to UKMIS New York, 3 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Blix’s
Briefing to the Security
Council and
P5’.
120
Telegram
1903 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 4 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Informal
Council Meeting with
Blix and El
Baradei’.
121
Letter Blix
and ElBaradei to Al‑Saadi, 8 October 2002, [untitled].
262