Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
331.  The Assessments Staff reported that Sunni political groups did not consider they
had sufficient votes to veto the Constitution, and judged that “local Sunni tribal leaders
will have considerable sway over the voters in their area; some have recommended a
‘no’ vote, but we do not know the views of many others”.
332.  By 12 October, Iraqi parties agreed a series of amendments to the draft
Constitution, including:
strengthening the provisions guaranteeing the unity of Iraq;
making clear that membership of the Ba’ath Party was not, in itself, a reason
for exclusion from public office and providing that de-Ba’athification was to be
subject to review by a separate body;
clarification over the use of official languages (Arabic and Kurdish were
designated national official languages throughout Iraq, though with the
expectation that Kurdish would be used primarily within Kurdistan; Turcoman
and Syrian were official languages within the areas where they were spoken);
and
providing for a constitutional review body to review the Constitution and make
recommendations for change to the National Assembly within four months.148
333.  The last point met a long-standing Sunni Arab demand for a major role for the next
National Assembly in approving the Constitution.
334.  Dr Reid sent Mr Powell a draft of a paper on security for consideration by DOP(I)
on 11 October, describing it as “inadequate, but a start”.149
335.  Dr Reid wrote that his paper was “meant as the first step in what is really required –
which is a detailed and co-ordinated Implementation plan”.
336.  DOP(I) met on 12 October and considered two papers: one from the IPU on the
UK’s next steps in supporting the political process towards elections and Dr Reid’s paper
on the security situation.150
337.  The IPU paper defined the UK Government’s main aim as maximising the
electoral strength of the national and non-sectarian centre ground, so that the resulting
government represented each of the ethnic and confessional groups and was committed
to plurality, non-sectarianism and the unity of Iraq.151
338.  The IPU paper contained Mr Asquith’s recommendation for a new meeting of
Ministers and senior officials to be held in advance of DOP(I). He also reminded the
148  Letter Straw to DOP(I) Committee Members, 13 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution Paper’ attaching
Paper IPU, ‘Constitution: Potential Points of Contention’; eGram 15446/05 Baghdad to FCO London,
12 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution: Update, 12 October 2005’.
149  Minute (handwritten) Reid to Powell, 11 October 2005, attaching Paper ‘Iraq Security Update’.
150  Minutes, 12 October 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
151  Paper IPU, 10 October 2005, ‘Political Strategy: Next Steps’.
544
Previous page | Contents | Next page