The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
331.
The
Assessments Staff reported that Sunni political groups did not
consider they
had
sufficient votes to veto the Constitution, and judged that “local
Sunni tribal leaders
will have
considerable sway over the voters in their area; some have
recommended a
‘no’ vote,
but we do not know the views of many others”.
332.
By 12 October,
Iraqi parties agreed a series of amendments to the
draft
Constitution,
including:
•
strengthening
the provisions guaranteeing the unity of Iraq;
•
making
clear that membership of the Ba’ath Party was not, in itself, a
reason
for
exclusion from public office and providing that de-Ba’athification
was to be
subject to
review by a separate body;
•
clarification
over the use of official languages (Arabic and Kurdish
were
designated
national official languages throughout Iraq, though with
the
expectation
that Kurdish would be used primarily within Kurdistan;
Turcoman
and Syrian
were official languages within the areas where they were
spoken);
and
•
providing
for a constitutional review body to review the Constitution and
make
recommendations
for change to the National Assembly within four
months.148
333.
The last point
met a long-standing Sunni Arab demand for a major role for the
next
National
Assembly in approving the Constitution.
334.
Dr Reid sent
Mr Powell a draft of a paper on security for consideration by
DOP(I)
on 11
October, describing it as “inadequate, but a
start”.149
335.
Dr Reid wrote
that his paper was “meant as the first step in what is really
required –
which is a
detailed and co-ordinated Implementation plan”.
336.
DOP(I) met on
12 October and considered two papers: one from the IPU on
the
UK’s next
steps in supporting the political process towards elections and Dr
Reid’s paper
on the
security situation.150
337.
The IPU paper
defined the UK Government’s main aim as maximising the
electoral
strength of the national and non-sectarian centre ground, so that
the resulting
government
represented each of the ethnic and confessional groups and was
committed
to
plurality, non-sectarianism and the unity of Iraq.151
338.
The IPU paper
contained Mr Asquith’s recommendation for a new meeting
of
Ministers
and senior officials to be held in advance of DOP(I). He also
reminded the
148
Letter
Straw to DOP(I) Committee Members, 13 October 2005, ‘Iraq:
Constitution Paper’ attaching
Paper IPU,
‘Constitution: Potential Points of Contention’; eGram 15446/05
Baghdad to FCO London,
12 October
2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution: Update, 12 October 2005’.
149
Minute
(handwritten) Reid to Powell, 11 October 2005, attaching Paper
‘Iraq Security Update’.
150
Minutes, 12
October 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
151
Paper IPU,
10 October 2005, ‘Political Strategy: Next Steps’.
544