The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
arms. In
many cases distinctions between Sunni Arab nationalists and
jihadists are
now blurred.”
88.
The JIC
assessed that AQ‑I remained the largest single insurgent network.
But the
impact of
Abu Musab al‑Zarqawi’s death had been short‑lived. His successor,
Abu Ayyub
al‑Masri,
was expected to continue al‑Zarqawi’s strategy and
tactics:
“…
including his campaign of attacks on the Shia to foment a civil war
which is
starting to
get results.”
89.
Mr Browne
described the Shia violence in southern Iraq to the Inquiry
as
“a competition
for influence and resources” that the UK was clear would need
to
be resolved
by a combination of Iraqi politics and the Iraqi security
forces.64
90.
Mr Browne
told the Inquiry that he had invested considerable time drawing
the
attention
of the Iraqi Government to the need to address the problems in the
South.
Prime
Minister Maliki had given an undertaking that he would deal with
the situation
and deploy
the necessary resources but “his machinery of government was not
always
capable of
delivering that, and he had the additional problem … that the
Provincial
Council in
Basra, at the time … did not function properly on
occasions”.
91.
On 20 July,
Mr Patey sent a valedictory telegram.65
It opened with
the summary
“Strategic
failure in Iraq a distinct possibility but not
inevitable.”
“The
prospect of a low intensity civil war and de facto division of Iraq
is probably
more likely
at this stage than a successful and sustained transition to a
stable
democracy
…
“Since the
transfer of sovereignty in 2004 we have made considerable
progress
in
developing the political process … But the process itself has also
exposed the
sectarian
divisions in the country …
“The
current levels of violence are as high as they have ever been and
the
increasingly
bold and sectarian nature of the violence is the most troubling
aspect.
There is
little doubt (and this analysis is shared by most Iraqis) that the
precipitate
departure
of coalition forces from Iraq would lead to open civil war
…”
93.
Looking ahead,
Mr Patey wrote:
“But the
position is not hopeless … Our strategy must be to get the Iraqis
to
increasingly
take the lead and responsibility. This will produce some
uncomfortable
moments but
in the long run is the only solution … It should be possible to
ensure
64
Public
hearing, 25 January 2010, pages 11, 13 and 16.
65
eGram
31514/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 20 July 2006, ‘Iraq:
Valedictory’.
18