14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

The Royal Engineers argued that Snatch vehicles placed EOD teams at “unacceptable

levels of risk” and reduced “operational capacity, capability, flexibility and effectiveness”.

They recommended the purchase of an off‑the‑shelf solution – the Sisu operated by the

Swedish Army.

224. The requirement for EOD teams was later identified as a “Type C” requirement and

is addressed later in this Section.

225. Lord Bach visited Basra from 27 to 28 April and reported an “almost universally

positive” message on equipment.110 On Project L* his visit report stated:

“Lord Bach understands that the delivery of vital ECM equipment procured under

this UOR is subject to delay. He would welcome advice on this and what is being

done to improve matters.”

226. On 21 May, an MOD official replied that the L* capability would be fully operational

by January 2005 as its outstanding components would start to be delivered in July

2004.111 The components already delivered would meet 90 to 95 percent of the threats

encountered “thus far” in Iraq.

227. The official wrote: “The delays in the delivery of the full L* capability are largely due

to the lack of clear threat and technical intelligence from the operational theatre.”

228. On 28 June, the UK suffered its first fatality from a roadside IED when Fusilier

Gordon Gentle was killed whilst performing top cover duties for a Snatch vehicle in

Basra.112 Two officers who were inside the vehicle survived the blast but suffered serious

injuries.

229. The PJHQ operational summary of the incident recorded:

“The sad death of a UK soldier in an IED attack today does not signal a step change

in activity in MND(SE); rather it illustrates how fortunate the UK has been to avoid

fatalities over the last few months.”113

230. The Board of Inquiry into Fusilier Gentle’s death concluded that there had been

serious delays in fitting the most up‑to‑date ECM equipment into vehicles and that the

IED that killed Fusilier Gentle would have been “inhibited” by that equipment, although

there was “insufficient evidence to prove this conclusively”.114

110 Minute PS/Minister(DP) to D Iraq, 29 April 2004, ‘Visit to Basra’.

111 Minute MOD [junior official] to PS/Minister DP), 21 May 2004, ‘Visit to Basra’.

112 BBC News, 29 October 2007, Fusilier’s final patrol described.

113 PJHQ OPSUM, 28 June 2004, ‘PJHQ Middle East Operations Team OPSUM 131 a at 281659Z Jun 04’.

114 Minute Mitchell to PS/Min(AF), 11 June 2008, ‘Claim by Rose Gentle in Respect of the Death of Her

Son Fusilier Gordon Gentle in Iraq on 28 June 2004’.

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