The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Preparations
for and holding of free and fair elections.
•
A new
representative government.”
94.
Mr Brenton was
relaying the same view of the political process to the
US
95.
The British
Embassy Washington reported some optimism that views in the
National
Security
Council were close to those of the UK, and were gaining traction
with President
Bush. But
there were some areas of disagreement between the US and UK, in
particular
on how the
IIA would be formed and the precise role the UN would play. The
fact that
they were
“not ready, having lost lives to liberate Iraq, to hand control of
it over to the
UN” was
described as a “US red line”.
96.
Reporting from
New York, Sir Jeremy Greenstock described a US vision for an
IIA
which would
“advise and assist” a Coalition which continued to run
Iraq.45
97.
At the Ad Hoc
Meeting on Iraq on 3 April, Mr Blair told attendees that the
IIA:
“… had to
be a genuinely representative body irrespective of how it was
brought
into being.
He intended to put forward an alternative to the ideas coming out
of
Washington
at present.”46
98.
On 4 April, Ms
Rose sent Mr Llewellyn the letter she had promised on
MOD
concerns
regarding potential ORHA actions, “with a view to identifying legal
issues for
further
consideration”.47
She wrote
that it was “of paramount importance” to clarify the
legal
issues regarding ORHA activity.
99.
Ms Rose
explained that the MOD expected that “at the national level”
ORHA
would
“direct Coalition action throughout Iraq”. Ms Rose identified a
need to consider
the UK’s
position on that role, and on the relationship between ORHA and
“the civil
administrations
in the areas of the country for which the UK will be
responsible”.
Ms Rose
explained that the MOD was discussing use of “the Joint Commission
model”
in those
areas to enable “effective civil-military crisis
co-ordination”.
100.
The letter
from Ms Rose listed a number of ORHA’s proposed activities that
were
“likely to
be illegal”, including:
•
installing
Coalition nominees as “shadow Ministers”;
•
filling
vacated posts in the Iraqi criminal justice system;
•
appointing
a US contractor to run Umm Qasr and opening a customs facility;
and
•
any
management or exploration of Iraqi oilfields that went beyond their
repair.
44
Telegram
428 Washington to FCO London, 3 April 2003, ‘US/Iraq: Phase IV’;
Telegram 448 Washington
to FCO
London, 4 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Post-Conflict’.
45
Telegram
614 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 5 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
Post-Conflict’.
46
Minutes, 3
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
47
Letter Rose
to Llewellyn, 4 April 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA’.
148