5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
with John
Grainger [FCO Legal Counsellor] and Michael Wood on 5 November
2002
and asked
for further information … but after this further consideration my
view
remained
the same. If I had reached a different view, I am sure that I
would have
made this
known, but I didn’t. I decided therefore to wrap the issue up … in
my draft
advice of
14 January 2003.”
216.
Lord
Goldsmith’s meeting with Mr Blair on 22 October 2002 is described
in Section 3.5.
217.
Asked whether
that advice was draft or definitive, Lord Goldsmith wrote: “In
one
sense the
whole of the advice of 14 January 2003 was draft”, but he “was
clear” that, in
relation to
the exercise of a veto, “that must have been understood by the
Prime Minister”.
218.
Asked whether
that was clear to Mr Blair, Lord Goldsmith wrote:
“I believe
so.”
219.
Asked whether
Mr Blair’s words that it was “necessary to be able to say
in
circumstances
where an unreasonable veto is put down that we would still act”,
and
Mr Blair’s
later comments83
during
a BBC
Newsnight interview
on 6 February, were
compatible
with his advice, Lord Goldsmith replied: “No.”
220.
Asked if he
was aware of Mr Blair’s statements at the time, and, if so,
what he
thought of
them, and what action he had taken, Lord Goldsmith
replied:
“I became
aware at some stage of the statements the Prime Minister made,
though
I cannot
recall precisely when. I was uncomfortable about them, and I
believe that
I discussed
my concerns with Jack Straw and my own staff, though I can find
no
record of a
formal note of any such conversations. I understood entirely the
need to
make public
statements which left Saddam Hussein in no doubt about our
firmness
of purpose.
It was more likely that he would co-operate if he thought that
there was
a real
likelihood of conflict. My concern was that we should not box
ourselves in by
the public
statements that were made, and create a situation which might then
have
221.
The Inquiry
asked Mr Blair:
•
whether he
considered that what he said on 15 January and 6 February
was
compatible
with Lord Goldsmith’s advice;
•
whether he
had received any other legal advice on the issue;
•
whether his
view that action could be taken was derived from the use of
force
without a
UNSCR in relation to Kosovo; and
83
“If the
inspectors do report that they can’t do their work properly because
Iraq is not co-operating there’s
no doubt …
that is a breach of the resolution. In those circumstances there
should be a further resolution.
If, however
… a country unreasonably in those circumstances put down a veto
then I would consider
action
outside of that.”; Statement, 17 January 2011, paragraphs
4.5-4.6.
84
Statement,
17 January 2011, paragraph 4.7.
45