The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr Blair
had, over the previous month, expressed his concern to Mr Hoon
over
the
additional costs associated with providing a large scale land force
as part of
a UK
contribution to a US‑led invasion of Iraq, and asked whether those
costs
had been
discussed with the Treasury.
The MOD and
the Treasury had, by the middle of October, developed
broad
estimates
of the cost of providing a large scale land force. Mr Brown
had also
been
provided with detailed analyses of the implications for public
expenditure of
a conflict
in Iraq.
At the
meeting where the decision to offer a large scale land force was
taken,
Admiral Sir
Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff, stated his belief
that
providing a
large military contribution to the campaign would mean that
the
UK would be
under less pressure to make a large contribution to
post‑conflict
reconstruction.
•
In February
and March 2003, when the
Government considered whether to
take on
military responsibility for a geographical area of Iraq in the
post‑conflict
period.
The MOD and
the Treasury had, by February, developed detailed estimates
of
the
potential cost of such a commitment (although there remained a
number of
unknown
factors).
When the
Government acceded in April to the US request that it
assume
leadership
of a military AOR encompassing four provinces in southern Iraq, it
did
so without
a robust analysis either of the strategic implications for the UK
or of
the
military’s capacity to support the UK’s potential obligations in
the region. A
step of
such magnitude should have been taken deliberately, having
considered
the wider
strategic and resource implications and contingent
liabilities.
In the
event, the UK was responsible for security in its AOR for six
years,
initially
as an Occupying Power and, from June 2004, in support of the
Iraqi
Government.
•
In advance
of Cabinet’s decision on 17 March 2003 to issue an
ultimatum
to Iraq and
ask the House of Commons to endorse the use of military
action
against
Iraq if necessary.
26.
The extent to
which cost should be a determining factor in reaching a policy
decision
is for
Ministers to judge based on the circumstances of each particular
case. But it is
essential
that those taking collective responsibility for a decision have the
ability to make
an informed
judgement about the likely costs and risks.
27.
Neither
Cabinet nor any of the Ministerial meetings convened to discuss
military
options and
the UK’s role in a post‑conflict Iraq were provided with detailed
cost
estimates
for the various policy options for the UK’s involvement in Iraq,
and their
implications
for public expenditure.
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