3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
an agenda
would allow him to be seen to be making efforts to comply and
therefore
to be
co-operating with the UN; and that it would be difficult to act on
a deadline
if Saddam
Hussein was seen still to be co-operating.
561.
Sir Richard
also wrote that there was ample evidence, including from
Dr Blix, that
Iraq was
not, and had no intention of, complying. Given the resources Saddam
Hussein
had
available to thwart inspections, and the scale of the task of
uncovering something
“truly
damning”, there was no guarantee that the inspections would produce
conclusive
physical
evidence.
562.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that the US would have difficulty with
any
language
which renegotiated resolution 1441 or changed the legal basis for
the
use of
force; and that there were difficulties in identifying concrete
tests which
did not
go beyond the resolution.
563.
Sir Jeremy
questioned whether the material was available to
convince
the majority
of the Security Council that the end of the road had been
reached.
564.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock discussed the way ahead with Dr Blix and,
separately,
Ambassador
Negroponte on 17 February, including informal ideas for an
ultimatum.155
565.
Sir Jeremy
told Dr Blix that the UK remained committed to disarmament
by
peaceful
means and to a second resolution. But the UK “wanted to force the
issue
in the next
four weeks”; and that there might be less time if the US
“baulked”.
566.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Dr Blix had “noted that it was amazing that, in
all their
inspections,
UNMOVIC had found no WMD except the (empty) chemical
warheads”.
Dr Blix
had also commented that nothing had been found in the sites
suggested by
the US:
“If they had come close there would at least have been a denial of
access.”
567.
In response,
the UK had “underlined the sophistication of the Iraqi
deception
regime – we
were confident in our intelligence while some information, e.g. on
BW
production,
was corroborated by a variety of sources”; and that “given the Iraq
deception
mechanism,
the key thing was co-operation”.
568.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that Ambassador Negroponte “showed interest in
an
ultimatum
process with concrete tests”, but he foresaw problems with
Washington.
The UK
should not propose language which renegotiated 1441 or changed the
legal
basis for
the use of force.
155
Telegram
271 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 18 February 2003, ‘Personal Iraq:
Meetings with
Blix and
Negroponte’.
281