9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
GC …
members, explaining that standards varied widely” and had made a
number of
recommendations
to improve the security provisions, which the CPA was taking
forward.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported on 24 September that the attack on Dr
al-Hashemi had
“sharpened
the angst in the GC … more broadly, about whether they are on the
right track
in hitching
themselves to a CPA which may be a dead end”.235
On 25
September, Sir Jeremy described the impact of the attack on GC
members’
concerns
about the overall security situation – “if IGC members were not
safe, what about
the general
public? … There were also questions about who was ultimately
responsible for
security.”236
Sir Jeremy
had explained to the GC that “this was a collective effort. Neither
of
us could
ensure security without the co-operation of the other.” He
concluded his telegram
by
observing that the debate had increased interest in the idea
of:
“… greater
involvement of already present Iraqi militia forces (the Peshmerga,
the
Badr
Brigade) in helping managing the security demands. Authorising
militias to
perform
security tasks is clearly beyond the pale. But we may have to start
thinking
creatively
– and I said this to the GC – about how we can use these forces
within
national,
clearly controlled structures.”
405.
A UK Iraq
Strategy was considered by the newly established Iraq Senior
Officials
Group
(ISOG), chaired by Sir Nigel Sheinwald, on 19 September, by which
time the
strategy
was in its third draft.237
406.
The ISOG had
commissioned a short-term Action Plan, subordinate to the
UK
strategy,
focused on “practical objectives where the UK can make a
quantifiable
difference
up until the end of 2003”. Departments were tasked to populate a
template.
407.
Funding for
the major initiative on infrastructure in the South still
remained
uncertain.
Sir Hilary Synnott was “confident of obtaining further CPA funds …
although
the
processes by which these would be transferred to CPA(South) are
unclear”.
408.
Reporting from
Basra on 22 September, Sir Hilary Synnott wrote that security
was:
“… the main
and constantly expressed concern of everyone we talk to …
Straight
criminality
may be developing into organised crime: a result of Saddam’s
emptying
of the
jails and general amnesty and the lifting of his draconian controls
… Many,
perhaps
most, of the citizenry would like the Army to go in and shoot a few
criminals
and, if we
insist that they follow due process of law, have them
hanged.
“We prefer
to use different methods, including the Maoist technique of
depriving
terrorists
and others of the political water in which to swim … Hence the
crucial
importance
of the Emergency Infrastructure Plan and the other plans in
hand
235
Teleletter
Greenstock to Sheinwald, 24 September 2003,
[untitled].
236
Telegram
181 Iraqrep to FCO London, 25 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Governing
Council roundup: death of
Aqila
Hashemi: security’.
237
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 22 September 2003,
‘Iraq: Senior Officials Group’.
275