The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
‘results’”.224
Mr Asquith
wrote that the departure of Ambassador Khalilzad would
“deprive
Iraq of one
of the great contrivers” and that his final act was:
“… a
de‑Ba’athification draft law – a characteristic mix of the bad and
the
superficially
plausible fix, designed to service immediate domestic US rather
than
Iraqi long
term interests. My Legal Adviser had been working closely with
the
Americans
and Iraqis for some months on the substance. I had in parallel
been
discussing
the provisions with political leaders. The key objectives were to
set an
early (eg.
six month) date for the termination of the de‑Ba’athification
Commission’s
work,
drawing a line definitively in the sand, reduce to as few as
possible
(1,200‑1,500)
those caught by the provisions and secure the agreement of
the
three‑man
Presidency Council to a text which could then be introduced
directly into
Parliament.
“…
Khalilzad persuaded the PM and President (alone) to sign off,
thereby failing
the
Constitutional condition for fast‑track introduction of
legislation. Those caught
by the
provisions will increase by 10‑12,000 (and indeed potentially many
more,
if
Provinces decide to exploit the latitude they are given on
implementation).The
termination
of the de‑Ba’athification Commission in a year is undermined by
the
creation of
a ‘Special Committee’ (of political/security ‘experts’ appointed by
the
Presidency
and PM) to adjudicate on security clearances for sensitive jobs (in
effect
a vetting
committee), which has no/no termination date. And the PM is given
the
right to
intervene in the decisions of the Special Committee and a separate
panel of
judges
appointed to consider the decisions of the de‑Ba’athification
Commission or
Special
Committee.”
284.
Mr Asquith
recorded that there had as yet been no co‑ordinated response
from
Sunni Arab
politicians. The only way to introduce the draft legislation into
Parliament
rapidly
would be to “bend the Constitution”.
285.
On 12 April,
Dr Mowaffak al‑Rubaie, the Iraqi National Security Adviser,
told
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald that the proposed “accountability and justice” law would
“allow
90 percent
of Ba’athists to return to work”.225
Those who
had held high rank would
be excluded
from the security ministries, but pension rights for the families
of those
who had
been prosecuted for their actions would be protected.
Dr Rubaie described
implementing
the policy as an uphill struggle, but pointed to a “growing
consensus in
support of
the need to rehabilitate and reconcile”.
286.
After visiting
Baghdad and Basra, Mr Des Browne, the Defence Secretary,
wrote
to
Mr Blair on 5 May with an assessment of work under way on
reconciliation and
its
prospects for success.226
Mr Browne
judged that a “bridging package” to attract
224
eGram
13103/07 Baghdad to London, 29 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly
Assessment’.
225
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Hickey, 12 April 2007, ‘Iraq:
Nigel Sheinwald’s Conversation with
Muaffaq al
Rubaie’.
226
Letter
Browne to Blair, 5 May 2007, ‘Iraq: Reconciliation’.
54