12.1 | Security Sector Reform

media interest grew.88 Until that point, the Government had been “reluctant” to discuss

openly how post‑conflict Iraq would be managed, but this was to be given greater

prominence as military action began.

118. The script was also circulated to all Embassies, High Commissions and Consulates

to aid the briefing of “key contacts”.89

119. Neither document made any reference to SSR.

120. Lt Gen Reith updated the Chiefs of Staff on Phase IV planning on 21 March.90

He warned that Phase IV delivery remained subject to “uncertain US dynamics at the

pol/mil [politico‑military] level” and identified a number of key issues that still required

resolution (see Section 6.5), including how to approach SSR.

121. Mr Bowen circulated a draft paper to senior officials in the FCO, MOD and DFID on

25 March that set out “British Post‑Conflict Objectives” (see Section 9.1).91 On SSR, the

draft stated that the UK would, with others, assist reform in Iraq by:

• supporting the observance of human rights, and legal and judicial reform; and

• helping Iraq generate reformed and accountable security forces acting in

accordance with human rights standards.

122. Mr Bowen suggested that officials should show the draft paper to their Ministers,

if they had not already done so: “We will then see the outcome of the Prime Ministerial

visit to Camp David and consider formal submission early next week.”

123. The AHMGIR met on 10 April.92 Ministers agreed that the UK should participate

in work being done by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA),

headed by retired US Lieutenant General Jay Garner. The UK should lead a group on

security sector management and planning for SSR.

The Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation (AHMGIR) was a sub‑committee of

Cabinet with a particular focus on the reconstruction of Iraq. It was chaired by the Foreign

Secretary and was attended by the Chancellor, Defence Secretary, Development Secretary

and Trade and Industry Secretary. The AHMGIR is described in detail in Section 2.

88 Minute Owen to Rycroft, 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV: Core Script’.

89 Telegram 150 FCO to Abidjan, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Core Script – Phase IV’.

90 Minute Reith to COSSEC, 21 March 2003, ‘Phase IV Planning – Taking Stock’.

91 Letter Bowen to Chaplin, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post Conflict Objectives’ attaching Paper [draft],

25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: British Post‑Conflict Objectives’.

92 Minutes, 10 April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

89