The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
28.
At their
meeting on 15 June, members of DOP(I) agreed that Mr Browne
should
take the
lead in pulling together a strategy for Basra, with the support of
the Cabinet
Office and
assistance from other departments.26
Mr Benn
would monitor developments
on the
electricity and power supply and Dr Kim Howells, FCO Minister of
State for the
Middle
East, would put forward proposals for supporting accelerated
development of the
southern
oil field.
29.
In discussion,
a member of DOP(I) suggested that the Cabinet Office paper
risked
being too
optimistic on security prospects, in the light of recent Joint
Intelligence
Committee
(JIC) Assessments.
30.
The JIC had
assessed in May that a strong Sunni insurgency would persist
beyond
2006.27
More
recently, it had judged that the ISF would need MNF support beyond
2007
31.
On Sunday 18
June, the Iraqi Ministerial Committee on National Security
(MCNS)
endorsed
the Basra Security Plan and recommended:
•
expanding
the Basra Security Committee (established by Prime Minister
Maliki
at the end
of May) to include a number of Basrawis;
•
appointing
a new overall security co‑ordinator for Basra; and
•
that the
Iraqi Ministries of the Interior and Defence should increase the
forces
available
for Basra, even if this was to the detriment of policing and
military
32.
The Committee
also considered whether the Basra Chief of Police and
the
Commander
of the Iraqi Army’s 10th Division should be removed from post but
had
concluded
they should remain for the time being.
33.
On 16 June,
the JIC considered the impact that involvement in Iraq was having
on
the threat
to the UK from international terrorism. It judged
that:
“Al Qaida
still regards the US as its main enemy and prime target … In the
West,
the UK is
still Al Qaida’s next most important target. But in the UK Al
Qaida’s intent
is combined
with capability … The relationship between the UK and Pakistan
has
given Al
Qaida access and capability … the majority of identified Islamist
extremists
in the UK
are British South Asians … Western European nations
characterise
the threat
they face as dominated by North African Islamist extremists. Many
are
inspired by
Al Qaida … The conflict in Iraq has energised Islamist
extremists, even in
countries …
that opposed the war and have no military presence there. Iraq has
also
motivated
Kurdish
Islamist extremists …”30
26
Minutes, 15
June 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
27
JIC
Assessment, 10 May 2006, ‘How is the Sunni Insurgency
Evolving?’
28
JIC
Assessment, 9 June 2006, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Fit for
Duty?’
29
Minute
Cullen to MA/CJO, 22 June 2006, ‘MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
22 June 2006’.
30
JIC
Assessment, 16 June 2006, ‘Al Qaida in the West: Focused on the
UK?’
8