9.6 | 27 June 2007 to April 2008

wider situation but few are labelled as British and are unlikely, anyway, to dissuade

committed hardliners from attacks …”

778. Sir John observed that, as UK forces were concentrated in Basra Air Station:

“… HMG now has less situational awareness and ground truth on what is going on

in Basra on a day to day basis …”

779. Asked by the Inquiry whether the relocation had reduced the ability of UK forces

to intervene in support of the ISF, Mr Day said: “No, I don’t think it did … We retained

the ability to re-engage, if asked to do so by the Iraqis, or if the threat to the airport

required it.”376

780. On 6 February, a senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2)

wrote to Mr Jenkins with an update on the Shia engagement strategy, in advance

of a planned discussion of Shia engagement at the Cabinet Office on 8 February.377

He outlined a proposal “to continue to work towards the broad strategy indicated in my

letter of 21 December”.

781. On Iranian influence, the senior official explained:

“As illustrated by the changes in the Secret Cells, for the time being Iran’s main

focus seems to be on building political influence. Just as [HMG] is seeking to pull

Iran’s proxies out of an Iranian orbit, the Iranians are reaching out to the new Sadrist

groups such as Adnan Al-Shahmani’s Iraqi National Gathering (ING) and Fadilah, to

ensure continuing lines of Iranian influence across Shia politics in Iraq. Meanwhile,

Muqtada al-Sadr remains marginalised.”

782. On 7 February, at the request of the MOD and the FCO, the JIC assessed changes

in the Sadrist Trend, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, and their implications for violence and

political reconciliation.378

783. It judged:

“I. The Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) is marginalised, in disarray and much

weaker politically than at any time since 2003. Muqtada al-Sadr’s goals are largely

unchanged. How he intends to achieve them and his own future role are less clear,

including to him.

“II. Sadr’s lineage means he will almost certainly remain a key ideological influence

for the Sadrist Trend. But his ability to exert political authority over the senior cadre

of OMS officials is now weak. He may relinquish his position altogether …

376 Public hearing, 6 January 2010, page 37.

377 Minute senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2) to Jenkins, 6 February 2008,

‘Shia engagement: [NAME OF OPERATION] update’.

378 JIC Assessment, 7 February 2008, ‘Iraq: Whither the Sadrist Trend?’

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