10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
that DFID’s
funds should be available that day.406
Implementation
of the Plan would start
at once.
Sir Hilary reported:
“In front
of the Minister [Mr Benn], Gen Lamb instructed his staff that
the pins were
to be
removed from the DFID doll.”
742.
Two days
later, in the context of an update of developments in Baghdad,
Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock, the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq,
reported:
“London
will hate me for saying this, but it is something keenly felt by
the best
senior
people in our military … the UK has not yet put the intensity of
resources into
the
civilian side of our operation, in terms of both personnel and
project money, to
convince
the Americans that our analysis … has to be listened to. If we
watch our
housekeeping
too carefully in this respect, we may be forced down the wrong
road
… I shall
have to come back to this quite soon.”407
743.
A Treasury
official provided advice to Mr Boateng on 18 September
on
how the
Treasury intended to deal with the expected surge in Iraq-related
claims on
744.
Departments
had seen Mr Blair’s call for a step-change in the UK effort in
Iraq
(on 3 June)
as “a legitimate invitation” to bid for more resources. Departments
were
developing
or considering seven bids. The largest of those was a bid being
prepared
by DFID
for around £250m, as the UK’s additional contribution to Iraq’s
reconstruction.
The UK
would need to make a pledge at the forthcoming Madrid Donors
Conference.
745.
The official
advised that it was vitally important to maintain pressure
on
departments,
both at Ministerial and official level, not to submit claims in the
first
place. The
Treasury would also continue to push for greater co-ordination
between
departments
in funding Iraq programmes.
746.
Treasury
officials had concluded that the best course of action in the
short-term
would be to
continue to scrutinise claims on a case-by-case basis, in terms of
value-
for-money,
impact, robustness of the costing, and robustness of the risk
management.
Departments
would also have to provide “clear evidence” on the extent to which
they
had
reprioritised their existing resources to accommodate
Iraq.
747.
The
availability of CPA funding was key. Some officials in CPA(South)
had
stated that
it was easier to secure funding from London than from CPA(Baghdad).
The
Treasury
should therefore continue to push for CPA(Baghdad) to fund
initiatives in the
South,
rather than providing a significant increase in UK funding, which
could create
406
Telegram 26
CPA(South) to FCO London, 22 September 2003, ‘South Iraq: Visit of
Hilary Benn:
Knots
Untied’.
407
Teleletter
Greenstock to Sheinwald, 24 September 2003,
[untitled].
408
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chief Secretary, 18 September 2003,
‘Iraq Funding FY 2003-04:
Dealing
with Reserve Claims’.
129