The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
727.
On 8 October,
Mr Brown announced that the MOD was placing an order for
an
additional
140 Mastiff vehicles.394
728.
In September
2007, the DOC reported on its “extensive review and analysis of
the
UK’s
current Force Protection (FP) capability in order to expose risk,
provide assurance
and present
strategic recommendations to COS [Chiefs of
Staff]”.395
729.
The review was
not specific to Iraq or Afghanistan but drew heavily on the
UK’s
experience
there. The review focused on:
•
risk and
governance;
•
the
application of theatre entry standards;
•
training;
•
lines of
communication;
•
protection
in the land, air and maritime environments;
•
operational
level protection; and
•
UOR
procured equipment.
“Before
undertaking an operation, COS should collectively reach a judgement
on
sensitivities,
likely benefits and consequences as well as the appetite –
amongst
public,
politicians and ministers – for sustaining casualties and
prosecuting
operations
that carried a certain degree of risk. This risk/benefit analysis
would be
articulated
and reviewed through the Strategic Estimate process. Any
guidance
would have
to be balanced to ensure that it was not overly prescriptive …
or,
conversely,
too generic …”
“… The
management of FP risk must be based on a thorough identification
of
strategic
and operational threats to ensure that a balance of research,
investment
and
training is achieved commensurate with the threat …
“In
deriving an assessment of cumulative risk, PJHQ should have a
clear
understanding
of the totality of known risk in the forces declared to it. This
should
include all
the equipment and other limitations which were accepted in
the
procurement
of force elements; all the subsequent limitations evident in
practice
together
with manpower, training or logistic support issues. If this risk
capture
process
works efficiently, CJO will be able to form an accurate judgment of
the risk
to the
protection of UK forces, which in turn would allow him to engage on
palliative
measures
required early in the operational planning process.”
394
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 8 October
2007, column 24.
395
Report DOC,
September 2007, ‘Protection of the Deployed Force Operational Audit
Report 1/07’.
126