Executive
Summary
891.
A government
should also address its explicit and implicit financial policy
that,
while there
should be no constraint on the provision of funding for military
operations,
it is
reasonable that for the same civilian/military operation,
departments should find
funding for
new civilian activities from within their existing budgets, which
are likely to be
fully
allocated to existing departmental priorities.
892.
A government
is likely to embark on major civilian/military operations such as
Iraq
only
rarely.
893.
A government
should recognise that, in such operations, the civilian
components
(including
diplomatic activity, reconstruction and Security Sector Reform)
will be critical
for
strategic success, may be very substantial, and must be properly
resourced.
894.
One
arrangement would be to create a budget for the civilian components
of the
operation,
under the direction of a senior Minister with lead responsibility
and in support
of a
coherent UK strategy. Once allocations were made from that budget
to individual
departments,
the allocations would be managed within departments’ legal and
policy
constraints.
Such an arrangement should:
•
ensure that
UK strategy was resourced;
•
promote
joint working;
•
minimise
the potential for gaming;
•
be able to
respond to in‑year priorities; and
•
reduce the
amount of time that Ministers and senior officials need to
spend
arguing
about funding individual activities.
895.
The Inquiry
recognises that, since 2003, significant changes have been made
to
the UK’s
strategic and operational approach to reconstruction and
stabilisation, including
to the
arrangements for funding such operations.
896.
In deciding to
undertake concurrent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
UK
knowingly
exceeded the Defence Planning Assumptions. All resources from that
point
onwards
were going to be stretched. Any decision which commits the UK to
extended
operations
in excess of the Defence Planning Assumptions should be based on
the most
rigorous
analysis of its potential implications, including for the
availability of relevant
capabilities
for UK forces.
897.
At the start
of Op TELIC, the MOD knew that it had capability gaps in
relation
to
protected mobility and ISTAR and that either could have a
significant impact on
operations.
Known gaps in such capabilities should always be clearly
communicated
to Ministers.
898.
The MOD should
be pro‑active in seeking to understand and articulate new
or
additional
equipment requirements. The MOD told the Inquiry that there was no
simple
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