The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
989.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald wrote to the FCO on 19 April, advising that Mr Blair
was
concerned
by the picture painted by the briefing he had received in advance
of his
meeting
with President Bush.579
Mr Blair
believed that a renewed effort was needed
by the CPA
and by departments in London. He had asked for 15 urgent reports,
which
should
be:
“…
unvarnished accounts of where things stand, with as much local
colour
as
possible; and with clear recommendations, where appropriate, for
how to
improve
things.”
990.
The accounts
included:
•
the
media;
•
reconstruction,
spending and disbursement;
•
everyday
life;
•
women’s
groups; and
•
schools,
universities and hospitals.
991.
Sir Nigel
advised that Mr Blair was prepared to put specific points
directly to
President
Bush, and suggested that Mr Richmond might draw the reports
together into
a weekly
or fortnightly “hit list of priorities”.
992.
The 20 April
meeting of the ISOG was advised that Mr Blair considered
that
progress
needed to be accelerated in all areas of reconstruction in order to
make
transition
a success.580
He had
decided to follow developments more closely himself.
Sir Nigel
had therefore commissioned a number of reports and recommendations
for
improvements
“to be written by the practitioners in Iraq
themselves”.
993.
On 21 April,
Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary, wrote
to
Sir Andrew
Turnbull, the Cabinet Secretary, and Permanent Secretaries to set
out the
arrangements
for looking after civilian personnel in Iraq.581
Detailed
contingency plans
for the
evacuation of UK staff in Bagdad were being drawn up, as “a matter
of prudent
planning:
the security situation in Iraq is tense, but no worse in most
places than it has
been
previously”.
994.
Referring to
concerns expressed by Permanent Secretaries at their
recent
Wednesday
morning meeting, that the withdrawal of civilian contractors could
undermine
the
reconstruction effort and hence exacerbate the security situation,
Sir Kevin advised:
“The impact
on reconstruction would indeed be serious if contractors
began
to withdraw,
although there is little evidence that this is happening on a
large
scale …
You may have seen David Richmond’s telegram of 18 April which
assess
579
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 19 April 2004, ‘Iraq’.
580
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Buck, 23 April 2004, ‘Iraq:
Senior Officials Group’.
581
Letter
Tebbit to Turnbull, 21 April 2004, [untitled].
172