4.1 | Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

326. Comments described as the “advice of DIS desk officers rather than the official

DIS position”, were sent to the Assessments Staff in advance of Mr Scarlett’s meeting,

including that:

• Iraq had not admitted “large-scale” production of VX agent until 1995; and

• there was insufficient intelligence to support a statement that the modification of

the L-29 (jet trainer aircraft) was designed to disperse chemical and biological

agents.149

327. A record of Mr Scarlett’s meeting produced by a DIS participant stated that

Mr Straw’s comment, that he had been “left with the conclusion that there is nothing

exceptional regarding Iraq”, was “seen as a fair assessment”.150 That was “to

be considered further”. The drafting comments on Iraq offered in the email from

AM French’s office had been accepted.

328. The DIS document which appears to have provided the basis for the

DIS comments sent to the Assessments Staff on 14 March, contained one additional

point on Iraq questioning the categorical statement in the Summary section of the draft

that Iraq had a chemical and biological weapons capability.151 The author stated that that

was historically correct, but:

“… we are currently unsure as to Iraq[’s] absolute capability. We feel there may be

difficulty supporting this in the public domain. We should prefer a bullet point similar

to … Iran.”

329. The relevant statement on Iran was that:

“Iran has a chemical weapons programme and is capable of producing a wide range

of chemical weapons. Iran is also capable of producing biological agents.”

330. The UK Government has been unable to locate a CO record of Mr Scarlett’s

meeting.152

331. A revised draft of the WMD paper, which had been agreed with the intelligence

agencies in the UK and included some comments from the US, was sent to Sir David

Manning by Mr Scarlett on 15 March.153

149 Email AMA/CDI to [junior official], 14 March 2002, ‘FW: WMD Programmes Draft’.

150 Minute DDI CPAC to PS/CDI and others, 14 March 2002, ‘WMD Programmes of Concern –

Public Version’.

151 Document [unattributed], [undated], ‘DIS comments on WMD Programmes of Concern’.

152 Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 16 September 2015, ‘Iraq Inquiry Request for

Documents’.

153 Minute Scarlett to Manning, 15 March 2002, ‘WMD Programmes of Concern’.

75