The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
6 March)
that the MOD would provide further advice on the outcome of
discussions with
the
US.
548.
Lt Gen Reith
wrote that the update also followed discussion among the
Chiefs
of Staff
about “a less constrained approach to operations such that [the] UK
can make
a decisive
contribution to Phase III operations, without impacting on the
strategic goal
of an
exemplary Phase IV plan”.
549.
Lt Gen Reith
recommended that the Chiefs of Staff agree that:
•
with UK
forces likely to be at Full Operating Capability (FOC) before
any
committal
to combat, UK combat elements could enhance the US
plan;
•
NBC
(nuclear, biological and chemical) and specialist engineer elements
be
released to
US forces for use during the seizure of the Rumaylah
oilfields;
•
the Joint
Commander be authorised to allow 1 (UK) Div to operate north of
the
current
planned UK AO, no further than Al Amara, “if this enhances 1
MEF’s
ability to
achieve its mission, on the understanding that the Division will
only
exploit
forward as far as security and transition to Phase IV within the
current
AO allows”;
and
•
plans
should be developed with the US for subsequent use of UK forces in
the
event of
sudden regime collapse or if decisive additional combat power
were
required.
550.
In the
attached paper, Lt Gen Reith advised:
“Further
opportunities to support a Coalition main effort also exist and
will be
event
driven … Whilst each scenario will differ, there will be occasions
where an
imperative
for Phase III success could drive us to balance risk between
supporting
the main
effort and our Phase IV exemplary action. Further work is needed
in
this area.”
551.
Lt Gen Reith
outlined the plan to extend the UK AO to the north at the Chiefs
of
Staff
meeting on 10 March.180
He
explained that the “current UK AO could potentially
result in
enemy forces around Basra interfering with Phase IV operations”.
There was
“a clear
military task to ensure that enemy forces in the areas outside the
current UK AO
were unable
to interfere with the UK Main Effort”.
552.
On 10 March,
the Chiefs of Staff discussed Lt Gen Reith’s paper. It endorsed
the
NBC and
specialist roles as time limited tasks within the UK’s
AO.
553.
Lt Gen Reith
highlighted potential roles for UK forces in the event of sudden
regime
collapse.
Adm Boyce directed Lt Gen Reith to develop options and brief the
Chiefs of
Staff
accordingly.
180
Minutes, 10
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
472