4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
343.
Sir Richard
Dearlove told the Hutton Inquiry that he had seen the draft
dossier
before the
JIC meeting, and that it was “normal practice” for him “to be
closely briefed”
before JIC
meetings.161
He added
that the process of producing the dossier had been
“covered
very closely on a day-to-day basis” by an SIS team, and that he had
been “kept
closely
involved”.
344.
Asked if any
comments from the DIS had been raised on the 45 minutes
point
at the JIC
discussion on 11 September, Sir Richard Dearlove told Lord Hutton
on
15 September:
“Not that I can recall. It was not raised.”162
345.
An SIS
officer, who was not an expert in the issues addressed in the
dossier,
sent a
colleague unsolicited general views about the draft. The officer
questioned
the
language used in the draft, which he thought needed to be more
convincing in
answering
the questions “Why Iraq?” and “Why now?”. The minute was also
sent
to senior
managers. It was drawn to the attention of Sir Richard Dearlove, by
his
Private Secretary,
before a meeting with Mr Blair on 12
September.163
346.
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s Private Secretary recorded that Sir Richard found
the
comments
useful and timely, and that Sir Richard had drawn on them
extensively
in his meeting
with Mr Blair.164
347.
The meeting
with Mr Blair is addressed later in this Section.
348.
Mr Bowen
pointed out that it was unclear what Saddam Hussein
intended
to do
with any weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic
missiles.
349.
Commenting on
the draft dossier of 10 September, Mr Bowen
wrote:
•
“The bit of
the jigsaw that doesn’t quite hang together is what Saddam
intends
to do with
the WMD he has been so intent on acquiring. It is one thing to
ask
the
rhetorical question: what could they be used for except making
mischief
regionally;
it is another to be able to point to stated objectives either from
the
intelligence
or public documents. It is, of course, the case that you point to
the
facts of
Saddam’s aggression and repression and use of WMD; perhaps we
can
make more
of this and his unpredictability.”
•
“In looking
at the WMD sections, you clearly want to be as firm and
authoritative
as you can
be. You will need to judge the extent to which you need to
hedge
your
judgements with … caveats. I appreciate that this can increase
the
authenticity
of the document in terms of it being a proper assessment, but
that
needs to be
weighed against the use that will be made by the opponents
of
161
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 15 September 2003, page 90.
162
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 15 September 2003, page 94.
163
Minute [SIS
internal minute], 12 September 2002.
164
Minute [SIS
internal minute], 12 September 2002.
179