9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
“Even at
this late stage, outreach to the Arab nationalist component of
society –
especially
the Sunni Arabs – is critical … I encourage the [Iraqi] Government
to
intensify
its efforts, and I know the Government is making efforts in this
direction.
“I
encourage all Iraqis to exercise their democratic right to vote.
Iraq needs as
broad‑based
a government as possible for a successful
transition.” 222
422.
The IIG’s
National Security Strategy was issued on 15
January.223
In it,
Prime
Minister
Allawi was reported to have increased the goal of training 100,000
Iraqi soldiers
by July to
150,000 “fully qualified” soldiers by the end of the
year.
423.
During a video
conference on 17 January, Mr Blair told President Bush that
they
had to give
a sense that Iraqiisation was “going somewhere” and that things
would
change
after the elections.224
424.
Mr Blair
suggested that the Luck Review (see Section 12.1) should feed
quickly
into a new,
public, security plan which would be clear what was being asked of
the
Iraqis. In
his view the weakness of Iraqi structures remained “a real
problem”.
425.
In advice to
Mr Straw on 19 January, Mr Asquith identified three
“immediate
threats”
as:
•
the
elections being declared illegitimate, most likely because of low
Sunni
turnout;
•
the Sunni
Arab community refusing to participate in the post-election
political
process;
and
•
excessive
delay in establishing a government following the elections,
with
a
consequential squeeze on the timetable for developing and agreeing
the
426.
The second of
these was, in Mr Asquith’s view, the most serious. He
recommended
that the
UK, working closely with the UN and other governments, should act
to:
•
encourage
Sunni leaders to participate fully in the political
process;
•
ensure that
Sunni Arabs were included in senior positions within
the
government;
and
•
support
engagement with Sunni rejectionist groups by members of
the
Transitional
National Assembly and Iraqi Transitional Government
members.
427.
The last of
these should include being prepared to “be more forward on
MNF-I
timelines”.
222
United
Nations, 14 January 2005, ‘Transcript of the Secretary-General’s
Press Conference’.
223
New York
Times, 24
February 2005, Iraqi Army
Is About to Add National Guard to Its Ranks.
224
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 17 January 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 17 January:
Iraq and
MEPP’.
225
Minute
Asquith to PS [FCO], 19 January 2005, ‘Iraq: The Immediate
Threats’.
463