9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
•
Intelligence:
increased intelligence and better intelligence analysis in order
to
take the
offensive against terrorists and “Ba’athist remnants”.
•
Infrastructure:
radical and rapid improvement in basic service
provision
(particularly
water, electricity and fuel) to maintain Iraqi
consent.
•
Media: a
“step change on media” to counter “distorted” reporting by Al
Jazeera
and other
satellite channels. Better presentation for the CPA and
Governing
Council.
•
Personnel:
more specialist support for the CPA in Baghdad and in the
provinces.
382.
Sir Nigel and
Dr Rice discussed the note during Sir Nigel’s visit to Washington
on
383.
Sir Nigel
reported to Mr Blair:
“We
share objectives; and
there now appear to be detailed plans
under
development
by the CPA in all the priority areas. Condi was particularly clear
on the
urgency of
work on electricity
(including
imports from Iran), police
and
CDC
[Civil
Defence
Corps] training, and confident that we were starting to develop a
coherent
strategy on
the media.”
384.
Sir Nigel and
Dr Rice agreed that there would be regular video
conferences
between
London, Washington and Baghdad “to ensure we are all working from
the same
script”.
385.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported on the political process a few days
later.
He wrote
that:
“An early
transfer of sovereignty … raises constitutional and practical
problems and
is unlikely
to deliver our aim of a democratic and stable Iraq. The current
political
process
still offers the best way forward and has not yet been derailed.
Nevertheless
we should
be thinking about fallbacks.”224
386.
Sir Jeremy
explained that the Seven Step Plan had already run into
trouble.
Firstly, as
Mr Richmond had set out, because of a desire for an elected
Constitutional
Convention.
387.
Secondly,
because of pressure from Members of the UN Security Council
to
accelerate
the process of handing over sovereignty to the Iraqis.
388.
Sir Jeremy
observed that if sovereignty were handed to the GC “questions
about
legitimacy
come to the fore”. Alternatively, it would be possible
to:
“… hold
‘quick and dirty’ elections for a provisional assembly, which would
then
draft a
Constitution and provide an interim but sovereign government. But
holding
223
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 14 September 2003, ‘Visit to
Washington’.
224
Telegram
165 IraqRep to FCO London, 15 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
271