3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
385.
Mr Straw
advised Mr Blair on 3 January 2003 that there was an urgent
need
to lower
expectations that military action against Iraq was
inevitable.
386.
The UK
should emphasise that the preferred strategy was
peaceful
disarmament
and that decisions would not be taken at the Security
Council
on 27 January.
387.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell’s view was that it would be rash to bank
on
an
assumption that the inspectors’ reports to the Security Council on
27 January
would
provide grounds to trigger a further meeting of the Security
Council and
a resolution
authorising the use of force.
388.
There was a
need for private discussions with the US on the strategy in
the
event that
the inspections failed to produce an “early and large smoking
gun”.
389.
Mr Straw’s
view was that a peaceful solution was, on balance, more
likely
than
conflict.
390.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Blair on 3 January 2003 about the need urgently to
lower
public
expectations, in the UK and abroad, that:
“… the die
will be cast at the Security Council meeting on 27 January. If we
are not
careful,
the necessary military build up will allow the media to set us up
for a fall …
when and if
the out come … is far from an authorisation for war. Your speech to
the
Diplomatic
Service Conference on Tuesday [7 January] is therefore very
important
in setting
the scene for the next three weeks.”137
“… a lot of
effort is being made by the … agencies to provide Blix and
ElBaradei
[with leads
drawing on intelligence reports] … to enable them to upgrade
their
inspections
over the next three weeks. It is possible that this will produce a
big
smoking
gun, sufficient for Blix and ElBaradei to point in their 27 January
report to
a breach
of obligation by Iraq sufficient to trigger OPs 11 and 12 of
[resolution] 1441,
a further
meeting of the Security Council, and a resolution authorising the
use of
force …
But, in my view (shared by Powell) it would be rash to bank on
this. So far,
reality has
not matched the expectation generated by the intelligence
…
“Scenarios
just as likely as a clear material breach by 27 January
are:
(i) an
indication from Blix/El‑Baradei that they have been broadly
satisfied
with the
level of co‑operation by Iraq, and have so far found nothing
of
any
significance but will continue looking;
137
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq – Plan
B’.
71