The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
forces in
theatre, to do much the same range of ongoing support tasks the
MNF
envisages
doing elsewhere in Iraq.
•
There are
some specific messages we should seek to promote in respect
of
the
readiness of Basra for transition. The US are sceptical about the
progress
we have
made in recent months. They point to the increased IDF
threat.
And General
Casey has rightly identified the police as the main
obstacle
to transition.”
416.
After
considering the IPU’s paper, it was decided that Mrs Beckett,
Mr Browne and
Mr Benn
would write jointly to members of DOP, setting out plans for
transition and a
proposal
for the timing of an announcement.224
417.
President
Bush’s announcement was also discussed by Cabinet immediately
after
the DOP(I)
meeting.225
Mr Blair
told members of Cabinet that plans for a reduction in
UK force
levels were on track, but implementation would be dependent on
achieving
the right
conditions on the ground, specifically rooting out the militias
from Basra city
and cutting
off Iranian assistance to the extremists. During his visit at the
end of 2006,
he had
“sensed, for the first time that Iraqi Generals felt that if they
were given the right
training
and equipment they would be able to do the job”.
418.
Mrs Beckett
told Cabinet that Op SINBAD had been more successful than she
had
dared to
hope. Although questions would be asked about UK withdrawals as the
US
surged, the
answer was simple; conditions were different in Basra.
419.
On 11 January,
at the request of the MOD, the JIC released an
Assessment
covering
the prospects for economic development and reconstruction in Iraq
over the
“I. Real
economic growth in Iraq continues to be positive. But the
government has
shown
little commitment to economic reform and large scale job creation
is unlikely
in the next
two years.
…
“III. The
security situation remains the main obstacle to domestic private
sector
investment
and foreign investment. The inability of the security forces to
create a
safe
environment for engineers to carry out repairs inhibits
reconstruction. But even
in a benign
security environment, Iraq would still face severe economic
challenges.”
224
Minutes, 11
January 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
225
Cabinet
Conclusions, 11 January 2007.
226
JIC
Assessment, 11 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Economic
Prospects’.
78