3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
364.
Addressing how
much, “if any” was left of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction,
Dr Blix
stated that UNMOVIC had not found any so far, “only a small number
of empty
chemical
munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed”. UNMOVIC
had
destroyed
the “laboratory quantity” of a “mustard gas precursor” that had
been found.
Many
proscribed weapons and items had not been accounted for,
but:
“One must
not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However that
possibility
is also not
excluded. If they exist they must be presented for destruction. If
they
do not
exist, credible evidence to that effect should be
presented.”
365.
Referring to
his warning on 27 January that Iraq should not brush aside
questions
on
significant outstanding issues of substance, including on anthrax,
the nerve agent
VX and long
range missiles, Dr Blix stated that the fact that Iraq had, in
its declaration
of 7
December 2002, “missed the opportunity to provide the fresh
material and evidence
needed to
respond to the open questions” was “perhaps the most important
problem
we are
facing”. He added:
“Although I
can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to
provide
the
evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it.
Iraq itself must
squarely
tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions.”
366.
Some papers
had been provided in Baghdad on 9 February. Dr Blix stated
that
“could be
indicative of a more active attitude” but there were problems
verifying the
quantities
of anthrax and two precursors for VX which Iraq had unilaterally
destroyed:
“Documentary
evidence and testimony by staff who dealt with the items still
appears to
be needed.”
Iraq’s initiative to identify 83 participants “in the unilateral
destruction in the
chemical
field” appeared “useful and pertain[ed] to co-operation on
substance”. Dr Blix
trusted
that Iraq would put together a “similar list of names of persons
who participated
in the
unilateral destruction of other proscribed items”.
367.
Dr Blix
also welcomed the extension of the mandate of an Iraqi commission
to
look for
any proscribed items and the appointment of a second commission to
search
for
documents relevant to the elimination of proscribed items and
programmes. But they
would
“evidently need to work fast and effectively to convince us, and
the world, that it is
a serious
effort”.
368.
Experts had
“concluded unanimously” that the two variants of the Al Samoud
2
missile
declared by Iraq were capable of exceeding the range of 150km.
Those, and
any of the
380 SA-2 (Volga) engines which had been imported in contravention
of
resolution
687 (1991) and converted for use in the Al Samoud missile system,
were
proscribed.
The casting chambers for missile motors were also proscribed.
Clarifications
were needed
before decisions could be made on the capabilities of the Al Fatah
missile
and the
al-Rafah engine test stand.
245