6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

1403. Asked about the assessment of the Iraqi opposition, Lord Boyce told the Inquiry

that he had not thought that Iraq’s fighting capability was going to be “any more

challenging than … in the North”.555

1404. Lord Boyce added that “one of the advantages” of the South which emerged “as

the battle plans started to develop” was that “we were to be given an area of operations

… which would … make it a cleaner operation” for the UK than working alongside the

US 4th Infantry Division:

“Our job … as we saw it, was going to be to fix the Iraqi or defeat the Iraqi divisions

in the South to make sure the Americans had untrammelled progress towards the

North without having to worry about their rear or their flank … That gave us a very

clear mission …”

1405. Lord Boyce told the Inquiry:

“Our feeling was that actually it [the South] might be … an easier place to deal with

than the North, or further north I mean, because … the vast majority of the people in

the South were Shia as opposed to the more heavy or original mix of Sunnis further

north where we thought there would be problems between the Sunnis and Shia once

the country – once we got past war end. Therefore, we were dealing with one sector

which hopefully would be working together … and would be cooperative … as we

tried to … regenerate the country after the fighting was over.”556

1406. In oral evidence, witnesses offered different views about their perception of

Turkey’s position in late 2002 and early January 2003.

1407. Maj Gen Wilson had reported on 17 July 2002 that US planners had been asked

to look at plans for a scenario without Turkey.

1408. DSF 1 told the Inquiry that he had informed Lt Gen Pigott “in about November”

that UK ground forces were “not going through Turkey”.557

1409. The Inquiry asked Sir Richard Dearlove at what stage he judged that the Turkish

route would not be possible.558 He told the Inquiry that “in the summer some time” it

was “clear that the Turkish General Staff … were not going to agree to a British military

deployment through Turkey”.

1410. Sir Richard added:

“… in the autumn, it became clear that there was going to be no British military

deployment through Turkey. The Turkish generals … were not going to change

their minds.”

555 Public hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 25‑26.

556 Public hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 26‑27.

557 Private hearing, 2010, page 19.

558 Private hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 44‑45.

381