The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
and trust
between the Council and Iraq”. The draft resolution did not
incorporate
concerns
expressed by Malaysia and others, including:
•
the
omission of financial modalities;
•
the vague
language “full of conditionalities” in respect of the triggering
of
suspensions;
•
the absence
of a definite benchmark or timeframe for the final lifting
of
sanctions;
•
the
indefinite continuation of the sanctions which violated “the very
spirit and
purposes”
of the UN Charter;
•
the
improvements in arrangements for humanitarian programmes which
were
“selective”
and would “only lead to incremental improvements and address
a
small
fraction of the needs of the Iraqi people”; and
•
Malaysia’s
proposal that the Council should give a hearing to Iraq’s views,
on
the basis
that “engaging Iraq, rather than isolating and demonizing
it”.
826.
The draft
resolution was:
“… driven
largely by political, rather than humanitarian, considerations. It
is aimed at
keeping
Iraq under continued isolation rather than bringing it out into the
mainstream
of
international life … The language of the draft resolution is
ambiguous in some
important
parts, so that it may lend itself to unilateral interpretation
and/or action
in its
implementation, which must be avoided.”
827.
Mr Qin
Huasun stated that three core issues would have to be
addressed
in formulating
new policies on Iraq:
•
An
“objective, impartial, transparent and accountable” inspection
commission
should
replace UNSCOM which “under the leadership of its previous
Executive
Chairman …
continuously concealed information from the Council,
deceived
and misled
the Council and even went so far as to act presumptuously
without
authorisation
by the Council, thus playing a dishonourable role in
triggering
the crisis”.
•
The
remaining disarmament issues should be “defined clearly and
precisely and
resolved
gradually and effectively”.
•
There was
“an urgent need to relieve the … tremendous, inhumane
suffering”
of the people
of Iraq.
828.
Mr Qin
Huasun added that those issues could be resolved only if the
resolution
could be
implemented; and that was “highly questionable” because it did not
give Iraq
the “light
at the end of the tunnel”. The Council was being “rushed … into
action” which
would “not
help to resolve” the issue. Nor would it “really help to preserve
the authority
and role of
the Council”. There had been “a worrying trend” over the past year.
Iraq
and Kosovo
had “clearly demonstrated that the wilful use of force, especially
unilateral
182