The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

162. There were also inconsistencies and areas which needed clarification, including:

• the omission of information on imports of bacterial growth media;

• declaration of the development of a variant of the Al Samoud missile which had

exceeded the permitted range in test flights; and

• a lack of supporting evidence to address unresolved issues identified in the

1999 UNSCOM and Amorim reports (see Section 1.1).

163. In conclusion, Dr Blix stated that, if Iraq failed to provide evidence supporting its

statements, the inspectors could not guarantee that all possibly concealed items and

activities would be found; but they would make attempts at concealment more difficult.

Mr John Scarlett recorded that he had discussed the JIC’s priorities for January 2003 with

Sir David Manning on 3 January.64 They had agreed that there would be:

“… a need to retest our standing judgements on:

• the continuing cohesion or otherwise of Saddam’s regime

• the developing attitudes of neighbouring/regional states

• the attitudes of the Kurds and other internal opposition forces”.

Mr Scarlett and Sir David had also agreed the JIC should attempt in mid-January to

answer the question “what will Saddam do now or next?” which “might allow us to retest

the standing judgements”.

Mr Scarlett wrote that he and Mr Julian Miller had agreed there would be a wider audience

“outside the MOD” for an “assessment of the significance of Iraqi military dispositions” and

its future options and strategy.

164. With indications of concerns in Washington about becoming trapped in

the UN, and tensions between the UN timetable and the military build-up, the

UK focus on the need to find convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein was

not complying with the obligations set out in resolution 1441 and preceding

resolutions intensified.

165. Mr William Ehrman, FCO Director General, Defence and Intelligence, advised

Mr Straw’s Private Secretary on 19 December that the UK was passing intelligence to

UNMOVIC but “We had not found a silver bullet yet.”65

64 Minute Scarlett to Miller, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Questions for the JIC’.

65 Minute Ehrman to PS/[FCO], 19 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Passing Intelligence to UNMOVIC’.

320