The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
inspections
over the next three weeks. It is possible that this will produce a
big
smoking gun
… But, in my view (shared by [Secretary] Powell) it would be
rash
to bank on
this. So far, reality has not matched the expectation generated
by
172.
On 4 January,
Mr Blair sent a long note to officials in No.10 (see Section
3.6).71
173.
On Iraq,
Mr Blair stated:
“We start
from behind. People suspect US motives; don’t accept Saddam is a
threat;
worry it
will make us a target. Yet the truth is removing Saddam is right;
he is a
threat; and
WMD has to be countered. So there is a big job of
persuasion.”
174.
The actions
proposed by Mr Blair included:
•
“most
obviously, the evidence of breach of the UN resolution leading
hopefully
to a new
resolution. Time is short. We need either evidence of actual WMD;
or
documentation
concealed; or an eye witness account of the programme.
We
are making
efforts on all three. But one or more needs to be in place. […]
our
biggest
hindrance, is the intimidation Saddam is exercising. Those who
might
co-operate
are being told very clearly their families will die. So even though
we
all know
the declaration … is a lie, proving the lie will be hard. I need an
early
meeting on
this with C [Sir Richard Dearlove].”
•
“We need to
set out the WMD case generally; publish evidence of it; and
have
some high
profile interdiction of WMD material. People just totally
underestimate
the
WMD threat.”
175.
Mr Blair
had a meeting with Sir Richard Dearlove on the afternoon of 9
January.72
There is no
No.10 record of the meeting.
176.
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s Private Secretary recorded Sir Richard’s view that it
had
been a good
meeting at which Mr Blair had emphasised the importance of
being able to
demonstrate
that the Iraqis were in material breach of resolution
1441.
177.
In response to
a question from Mr Blair about the likelihood of being able to
find
a “silver
bullet” that would demonstrate a material breach, Sir Richard was
reported to
have said
that “he felt the odds were 50/50”. That was “higher than the US
estimates but
he simply
could not guarantee a successful outcome”.
178.
Sir Richard
had also reported that Mr Blair’s parting words were:
“Richard, my fate
is in your
hands.”
70
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq – Plan
B’.
71
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 4 January 2003, [extract
‘Iraq’].
72
SIS record,
9 January 2003, ‘PM Meeting on Iraq’.
322