4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

419. A minute for the file written by SIS9 recorded that he and Sir Richard Dearlove

had briefed Mr Blair on the sources of the report (of 11 September) on 12 September.202

The sources were not named but Mr Blair was given details of the source’s background

and his access, and his relationship with the sub-source.

420. Mr Blair was also briefed on two other sources who had provided recent reports.

421. Sir David Manning, Mr Powell and Mr Campbell were present.

422. Mr Campbell wrote:

“Meeting with TB, Jonathan, DM, AC, C and a SIS colleague re chemical and

biological weapons, and what Blix would be looking for if the inspectors went in.

It showed what was going on was really bad and getting worse, that he [Saddam

Hussein] was determined to keep WMD for reasons of regional power. They were

strategically vital and he was going to keep them come what may. C said we could

use some of the material through assertion.

“They were confident this stuff was real, not being run against us. SIS believed the

regime would collapse and there would be lots of defections etc. Very interesting

meeting.”203

423. Sir Richard Dearlove told the Butler Review in 2004 that he had had a meeting with

Mr Blair on 12 September to brief him on SIS operations in respect of Iraq, and that he

had briefed the Prime Minister on each of SIS’ main sources including the new source

on trial.204

424. Sir Richard also told the Butler Review that he had:

“… underlined to the Prime Minister the potential importance of the new source [of

the 11 September report] and what SIS understood his access to be; but also said

that the case was developmental and that the source remained unproven.”

425. The Butler Report stated that SIS had hopes that this source would become

a major asset.205 In particular, the source had indicated to SIS that he would be able

to provide substantial and critical additional intelligence in the near future.

426. SIS4 suggested that Mr Blair had already known about the intelligence before

the meeting between Mr Blair and Sir Richard Dearlove on 12 September, and that

he wanted to see the product.206

202 Minute [SIS internal record], 12 September 2002.

203 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

204 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 578.

205 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 574.

206 Private hearing Part 1, page 58.

193