The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

64.  Mr Straw asked Mr Blair to raise several issues with President Bush during their

telephone call planned for later in the week. He urged Mr Blair to lobby on behalf of

Siemens UK for access to power supply contracts and encouraged him to seek the

President’s agreement to “a good number of women, we think 20 percent, in Iraq’s new

political institutions”.

65.  Mr Straw also enclosed a paper written by the FCO United Nations Department

which envisaged a leading role in the political process for Mr Vieira de Mello. It noted

that “long term political stability in Iraq will depend [on] having political parties which are

not drawn up wholly along ethnic/religious lines. Ensuring this will be a difficult task.”

66.  On the same day, Mr Straw sent a separate, personal letter to Mr Blair.27 In it, he

asked Mr Blair to raise a number of points “very forcefully” with President Bush.

67.  The first of those was that the UK “must be fully involved in all decisions [made

by the CPA] since the US has forced us to be jointly responsible for the effect of all

Coalition decisions across Iraq”. Since “the US refused” to agree a Memorandum

of Understanding (MOU) saying that the UK was solely responsible for parts of

southern Iraq:

“… as Peter Goldsmith [the Attorney General] advises (undoubtedly correctly) – we

are jointly liable for all decisions – but many complaints that we are being sidelined

in CPA, below Sawers’ level”.

68.  Mr Blair told the Inquiry that, while consultation with the US was not perfect, and

Mr Straw’s letter was an expression of frustration, that was one of the reasons that he

had sent people of the calibre of Mr Sawers and then Sir Jeremy Greenstock to Iraq to

ensure that UK views were communicated effectively.28

69.  Mr Blair also said that if it had been possible to agree an MOU, that would not itself

have made the relationship work, which instead was based on Mr Blair’s relationship

with President Bush, Mr Straw’s with Mr Colin Powell (the US Secretary of State),

and others.

70.  Mr Blair held a further meeting on Iraq on 6 June.29 It was attended by Mr Straw and

Gen Walker as well as those who had been present on 3 June.

71.  Mr Cannon reported the main points from the meeting to Mr McDonald. It had been

agreed that Mr Blair should tell President Bush that the UK needed “the decision-making

process on a different footing, so that problems are rapidly referred to the highest level

and obstacles short-cut”.

27  Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 5 June 2003, ‘Iraq’.

28  Public hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 140-141.

29  Letter Cannon to McDonald, 6 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s meeting 6th June’.

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