4.3  |  Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

{{Other key equipment is being buried or kept constantly on the move

using trucks.

{{Whatever the Iraqi regime says, there is no doubt that scientists and their

families are being intimidated from having private interviews even inside

Iraq, let alone outside.”

188.  The note also set out the effects of chemical and biological weapons along the

lines of the information provided in the September dossier.

189.  Mr Scarlett subsequently sent the note to SIS1 with copies to the MOD Deputy

Chief of Defence Intelligence and the Press Offices of the MOD and the FCO.81

190.  In response to a request for themes which Mr Blair could use with the press,

and in particular on Breakfast with Frost on 26 January, SIS1 submitted advice to

Sir David Manning on 25 January.82

191.  That set out four “Themes from CX”, “for use with the press”. The points to

make included:

• G  iving the UN the run around: Saddam Hussein was “determined to keep his

weapons” and believed he could “successfully hide them from the UN”. There

was “reliable intelligence, which we have been sharing with the UN inspectors,

that for the last few months the Iraqis have been dispersing and concealing

the evidence: hiding munitions for chemical warfare, engines for long-range

missiles, top secret documents”.

• S  pying on the inspectors: intelligence had “confirmed” that there was “a huge,

well co-ordinated Iraqi operation to spy on the inspectors … there are well

rehearsed plans to prevent them from having access to sites where the weapons

are concealed. Iraq’s security agents have orders even to stage car accidents, if

necessary, to prevent at all costs the inspectors from finding anything significant.

These agents dare not fail: they know only too well what the consequences for

them personally would be.”

• Saddam Hussein rules by fear and repression: “we have intelligence

Saddam has ordered that any scientists who dare to co-operate will be severely

punished, even killed, along with their families. They have been forced to

hide secret documents at home. Iraq’s ruthless security apparatus has placed

minders alongside everyone who could give the game away to inspectors to

ensure that they don’t step out of line and to remind them what will happen to

them if they do.”

• B  ut cracks are beginning to show: “intelligence reveals that … some senior

officials – even members of Saddam’s family are beginning to realise the game

is up …”

81  Minute Scarlett to SIS1, 24 January 2003, [untitled].

82  Minute [SIS1 to Manning], 25 January 2003, attaching Paper, ‘Iraq: Themes from CX’.

327