The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The “three
recent meetings of the Council more than fulfil the
requirement
for
immediate consideration of reports of non-compliance. So we can
say
convincingly
that the process set out in 1441 is complete. If we push a
second
resolution
to a veto, then the last word on the Security Council record is a
formal
rejection
of a proposal that Iraq has failed to take its final
opportunity.”
152.
Mr Straw
advised that it would be “more compelling in Parliament and with
public
opinion to
take our stand on the basis of [resolution] 1441, and the
overwhelming
evidence
that Iraq has not used the four months since then to co-operate
‘immediately,
unconditionally
and actively’”. The UNMOVIC “clusters” document would be “a
material
help in
making that case”.
153.
Mr Straw
advised Mr Blair that he interpreted Mr Annan’s
“important” statement
on 10 March:
“…
essentially as a gypsies’ warning not to try and then fail with a
second resolution.
If the last
current act of the Security Council on Iraq is 1441, we can
genuinely claim
that we
have met Kofi’s call for unity and for acting within (our
interpretation of) the
authority
of the Security Council.”
154.
There was no
reference in Mr Straw’s minute to President Chirac’s remarks
the
previous
evening.
155.
Mr Straw
advised Mr Blair that it would not be possible to decide what
the
Parliamentary
Labour Party and the House of Commons would agree until
deliberations
in the
Security Council had concluded. If a second resolution was agreed,
it would be
“fine”, but
that was “unlikely”. He added:
“I sensed
yesterday that sentiment might be shifting our way; but we would
need to
be very
clear of the result before putting down a resolution approving
military action.
We could
not possibly countenance the risk of a defeat …
“But it
need not be a disaster for you, the Government, and even more
important for
our troops,
if we cannot take an active part in the initial invasion, provided
we get on
the front
foot with our strategy.
“I am aware
of all the difficulties of the UK standing aside from invasion
operations,
not least
given the level of integration of our forces with those of the US.
But I
understand
that the US could if necessary adjust their plan rapidly to cope
without
us … [W]e
could nevertheless offer them a major UK contribution to the
overall
campaign.
In addition to staunch political support, this would
include:
•
intelligence
co-operation;
•
use of
Diego Garcia, Fairford and Cyprus, subject to the usual
consultation on
targeting;
and
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