The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
inspectors
and by repeatedly denying access to facilities which
UNSCOM
wished to
inspect”.
•
The
coalition was exercising “the authority given by the Security
Council” in
resolution
678 (1990) “for Member States to employ all necessary
means
to secure
Iraqi compliance with the Council’s resolutions and to
restore
international
peace and security in the area”.
•
The resort
to military force was “necessitated” by Iraq’s “policy of
unremitting
defiance
and non-compliance”.
670.
In a
parallel letter to the
President of the Security Council, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
stated that
the action was taken “following a long history of non-co-operation
by
Iraq”.273
Iraq had
promised on 14 November to co-operate fully, but
Mr Butler’s letter of
15 December
stated “clearly that Iraq did not provide the full co-operation it
promised”,
and that
UNSCOM was “unable as a result to conduct the substantive work
mandated
to it
by the Security Council”.
671.
Sir Jeremy
added that the UK’s objective was:
“…
compliance by the Iraqi Leadership with the obligations laid down
by the Council.
The
operation was undertaken when it became apparent that there was no
prospect
of this
being achieved by peaceful means. It will have the effect of
degrading
capabilities
which have been the subject of Security Council resolutions over
the
past nine
years. Targets have been carefully chosen to avoid civilian
casualties.”274
672.
In the
subsequent meeting of the Council, Mr Hamdoon condemned
the
“aggression”
of the US and UK and the decision to flout international law and
the
673.
Mr Hamdoon
also criticised Mr Butler’s “partiality, lack of integrity and
lack of
objectivity”
by singling out five incidents from 300 inspections as “categorical
evidence
of lack of
co-operation” when the circumstances did not justify that
conclusion, and for
withdrawing
the inspectors without the knowledge or authority of the Council
“to pave
the way
completely for the military aggression”.
674.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock recalled the “long road” to the crisis citing Iraq’s use
of
chemical
weapons against Iran and its own civilians and its behaviour since
1991,
including:
•
“never”
giving UNSCOM the co-operation it needed to complete its
tasks;
273
UN Security
Council, ‘Letter dated 16 December 1998 from the Permanent
Representative of the
United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
addressed to the President
of the
Security Council’ (S/1998/1182).
274
UN Security
Council, ‘Letter dated 16 December 1998 from the Permanent
Representative of the
United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
addressed to the President
of the
Security Council’ (S/1998/1182).
275
UN Security
Council, ‘3955th Meeting Wednesday 16 December 1998’
(S/PV.3995).
150