The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
In a report
to Congress on 13 October 2005, the DoD assessed:
“The
decentralised and dispersed nature of this force has fostered an
environment in
which
corruption, “ghost” employees [employees on the payroll but not
presenting for
duty], and
absent without leave rates remain a significant
concern.”745
798.
DCC Smith
completed his tour of Iraq in April 2006.746
He described a
number of
difficulties
experienced during his tour in his end of mission report,
including:
•
lack of an
agreed, resourced strategy: “There was not a shortage of … plans
…
What has
been lacking for three years is a will and an organisational
capability
to develop,
and act upon, such a strategy”;
•
confusion
over command of various personnel involved in policing: “Even
the
Review
conducted by Sir Ronnie Flanagan [HM Chief Inspector of
Constabulary;
the Review
is described later in this Section] … failed to provide a
clear
statement”,
with the security situation making a military lead inevitable in
2006;
and
•
prioritisation
of scarce resources: he highlighted a number of areas where
the
UK could
have played a significant role but were unable to resource
initiatives
either
through funding or appropriate personnel.
799.
Elections were
held in December 2005 but it was not until May 2006 that the
Iraqi
Government
was formed (see Section 9.4). As the period of time taken to form a
new
government
extended, British military commanders in Iraq observed an increase
in
800.
A report to
Congress on 30 November 2006 stated that Sunni and Shia
“death
squads”
were responsible for the significant increase in sectarian violence
in Iraq.748
Those were
defined as “armed groups that conduct extra‑judicial killings;
formed from
terrorists,
militias, illegal armed groups, and – in some cases – elements of
the ISF”.
801.
During his
visit to Baghdad in March 2006, Dr Reid had raised the role of
the militia
with a
number of interlocutors.749
Mr Sa’adoun
al‑Dulaimi, Iraqi Minister for Defence,
reported
that he felt under pressure to incorporate sectarian militias into
the IMOD,
noting that
“the Ministry of the Interior seemed completely open to the
integration of
militias”.
Mr Jabr commented that “too many old regime staff had been
brought back in”
and “could
not simply be removed”.
745
Report to
Congress, 13 October 2005, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
746
Report
Smith, May 2006, ‘End of Mission Report’.
747
Public
hearing Houghton and Style, 5 January 2010, pages 8‑9.
748
Report to
Congress, 30 November 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
749
Minute
APS/Secretary of State [MOD] to PS/Policy Director [MOD], 21 March
2006, ‘Secretary
of State’s
visit to Iraq’.
236