6.3 | Military equipment (pre-conflict)

was “the breaking of LAND mandated and resourced readiness states and training in

readiness assumptions”.321 He added:

“OP TELIC demonstrated clearly that current readiness states are not in line with

strategic reality … The time given for deployment was significantly shorter than

that defined in the Defence Planning Assumptions. This had many impacts in the

manning, equipping and building the … sustainability of the force.”

605. Reports published in 2003 after the conflict suggested that land equipment

performed well during the combat phase of operations.

606. In the MOD’s First Reflections report on operations in Iraq in July 2003, it stated

that the “success of operations in Iraq demonstrated the effectiveness and extensive

capability of the modern equipment and logistics support available to our Armed

Forces”.322

607. The MOD’s second report, Lessons for the Future, assessed that:

“Overall, land equipment performed well and reliability levels were often

exceptionally high despite the challenges of a very demanding environment.”323

608. The DOC stated that during the deployment and invasion phases of Op TELIC,

“UK equipment and maintenance regimes coped well with the environment and

manoeuvre demands placed upon them”.324

609. The NAO concluded in its report on 11 December 2003 that:

“Throughout the war-fighting phase of Operation TELIC a number of both new and

in service equipments operated effectively in the austere environment of Iraq.”325

610. The late delivery of some UORs, however, meant that soldiers were not

always able to be trained on equipment before its use.

611. The DOC report on 17 October 2003 stated:

“A consequence of the compressed timescales for UOR delivery was that personnel

did not always have time to train or become properly familiar with equipment, either

before deployment or in theatre … This undermined the rationale for delivering

UOR equipment to improve operational effectiveness. Users did not have complete

confidence in their ability to use equipment, and commanders were not always able

321 Report Wall to HQ 3 Cdo Bde, 6 October 2003, ‘Post Operation Report – Version 2 Operation TELIC’.

322 Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, July 2003.

323 Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December 2003.

324 Report DOC, 17 October 2003, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study’.

325 National Audit Office, Operation TELIC – United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq,

11 December 2003, HC 60.

99