The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses conclusions in relation to the evidence set out
in
Section 14.1,
including:
•
where there
was a failure to address capability gaps in equipment;
and
•
the impact
of running two medium scale operations concurrently.
2.
This Section
does not address conclusions in relation to:
•
how
equipment was funded, which is addressed in Section
13.2;
•
the failure
to ensure that the UK was adequately prepared for post‑conflict
Iraq
contingencies,
which is addressed in Section 6.5;
•
MOD
operational policy, or judgements on the specific circumstances in
which
individuals
lost their lives in Iraq; and
•
the MOD’s
procedure for supporting those killed or injured in Iraq, which
is
addressed
in Section 16.4.
•
Between 2003
and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key
capability
areas,
including protected mobility, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition
and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) and helicopter support.
•
It was not
sufficiently clear which person or department within the
MOD
had responsibility
for identifying and articulating capability gaps.
•
Delays in
providing adequate medium weight Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPVs)
and
the failure
to meet the needs of UK forces in Multi‑National Division
(South‑East)
(MND(SE))
for ISTAR and helicopters should not have been
tolerated.
•
The MOD was
slow in responding to the developing threat in Iraq from
Improvised
Explosive
Devices (IEDs). The range of protected mobility options available
to
commanders
in MND(SE) was limited. Although work had begun before 2002
to
source an
additional PPV, it was only ordered in July 2006 following
Ministerial
intervention.
•
Funding was
not a direct barrier to the identification and deployment of
additional
solutions
to the medium weight PPV gap. But it appears that the longer‑term
focus
of the
Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB) on the Future Rapid
Effect
System
(FRES) programme inhibited it from addressing the more immediate
issue
related to
medium weight PPV capability.
•
The decision
to deploy troops to Afghanistan had a material impact on the
availability
of key
capabilities for deployment to Iraq, particularly helicopters and
ISTAR.
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